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REQUIEM FOR ROTH: OBSCENITY DOCTRINE 
IS CHANGING 
David E. Engdahl* 
I. HARK! THE REQUIEM 
IN 1957, the Supreme Court decided Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California/ and thereby commenced what has proved 
to be one of the most perplexing and politically sensitive tasks the 
Court has ever undertaken2-determining the constitutional limita-
tions on the power of state and federal governments to regulate 
obscenity. After twelve years of decisions in the obscenity field, the 
regrettable truth is that "no stable approach to the obscenity prob-
lem has yet been devised by [the] Court."3 The unreconciled con-
flicts among the several opinions of Supreme Court Justices ·written 
since 1957, and the new uncertainties created by the substantial 
changes in the personnel of the Court, make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to extract controlling principles from the obscenity cases. But 
in the cacophony which now prevails, a careful ear can pick out the 
opening strains of a developing theme-a theme which is quite dif-
ferent from that played in the most noted opinions in the cases de-
cided since Roth v. United States. The symphony which seems to be 
emerging is a requiem for Roth. 
The fundamental holding of Roth was that "obscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."4 A 
bare majority of five Justices joined in the Court's opinion in that 
case, and only one of those Justices is still on the Court.5 Chief 
Justice Warren concurred in the result on narrower grounds; 6 Jus-
tice Harlan rejected the reasoning of the Court's opinion, although 
• Associate Professor and Director, The Law Revision Center, University of Colo-
rado School of Law; Member of the Michigan Bar. A.B. 1961, LL.B. 1964, University 
of Kansas; S.J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
2. The obscenity decisions undoubtedly have aggravated the strong tensions sur-
rounding the Supreme Court as an institution. This fact is clearly demonstrated by the 
congressional clamor over Justice Fortas' obscenity opinions during the hearings on 
his nomination for Chief Justice. 
3. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a '\\Toman of Pleasure" v. Attorney 
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) Gustice Harlan, dissenting) [here-
inafter Memoirs v. Massachusetts]. 
4. 354 U.S. at 485. 
5. The majority in Roth consisted of Justices Brennan, Burton, Clark, Frankfurter, 
and Whittaker. 
6. 354 U.S. at 495-96. Chief Justice Warren's opinion is quoted in the text accom-
panying note 46 infra. 
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he partially concurred in the result; and Justices Black and Douglas 
joined in a spirited dissent. In the years since Roth, those Justices 
who opposed the decision at the outset have not retreated from their 
positions, while the supporters of the Roth rationale on the Court 
have dwindled and have fallen into disagreement among themselves 
over its subsequent application. 
A. The Present Cacophony 
It will be well, before proceeding to assess the current vitality-
or morbidity-of the Roth rationale, to fix in mind the several con-
flicting doctrines which certain members of the Supreme Court still 
maintain. 
The view which Justice Douglas holds toward the suppression of 
obscenity was expressed in his dissenting opinion in Roth. In that 
dissent, he admitted that "[f]reedom of expression can be suppressed 
if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action 
as to be an inseparable part of it";7 indeed, he insisted that "[a]s a peo-
ple, we cannot afford to relax that standard.''8 But he observed, re-
ferring to the scientific evidence, that "it is by no means clear that 
obscene literature ... is a significant factor in influencing substantial 
deviations from the community standards.''9 He concluded that 
"[t]he absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene 
literature on human conduct should make us wary. It should put us 
on the side of protecting society's interest in literature, except and 
unless it can be said that the particular publication has an impact on 
actions that the government can control."10 Justice Douglas flatly 
rejected the majority's ipse dixit that "obscenity is not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech or press," and said, "I would 
give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full support. I have 
the same confidence in the ability of our people to reject noxious 
literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the 
false in theology, economics, politics, or any other field."11 In the 
cases decided since Roth, Justice Douglas has not softened his 
position. In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman 
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts (Memoirs v. Mas-
sachusetts),12 he reiterated his view "that the First Amendment does 
7. 354 U.S. at 514. 
8. 354 U.S. at 514. 
9. 354 U.S. at 510. 
IO. 354 U.S. at 511. 
ll. 354 U.S. at 514. 
12. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
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not permit the censorship of expression not brigaded with illegal 
action."13 He declared that "[t]he Court's contrary conclusion in 
Roth, where obscenity was found to be 'outside' the First Amend-
ment, is without justification."14 If there has been any change in 
Douglas' view, the change has been toward greater adamancy. In 
Ginzburg v. United States,15 he wrote in dissent: 
[I]he First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed-whether 
orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. . . . The theory is that 
people are mature enough to pick and choose, to recognize trash 
when they see it, to be attracted to the literature that satisfies their 
deepest need, and hopefully, to move from plateau to plateau 
to finally reach the world of enduring ideas. 
I think this is the ideal of the Free Society written into our Con-
stitution .... It is shocking to me for us to send to prison anyone 
for publishing anything, especially tracts so distant from any in-
citement to action as the ones before us.16 
Justice Douglas continues to insist that identical restraints on 
governmental suppression are imposed by the first amendment upon 
the national government and, by the incorporation of the first 
amendment into the fourteenth, upon the states. Until those re-
straints are relaxed by constitutional amendment, he maintains, ob-
scenity can be suppressed by any level of government no more 
readily than any other expression that is not demonstrably and suf-
ficiently related to illegal action.17 
Justice Black concurred in Douglas' dissent in Roth, and has 
also concurred in some of Douglas' subsequent obscenity opinions.18 
In the opinions which Justice Black himself has written on the sub-
ject, he has confirmed his conviction that "the Roth case was wrongly 
decided."19 Obscenity censorship laws are, he contends, "in plain 
violation of the unequivocal prohibition . . . against 'abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.' "20 He stated in Ginzburg that 
"the Federal Government is without any power whatever under 
the Constitution to put any type of burden on speech and expres-
Ill. 383 U.S. at 426. 
14. 383 U.S. at 428. 
15. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
16. 383 U.S. at 491-92. 
17. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650-71 (1968) (dissenting opinion). 
18. E.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 703 (1968); Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968). 
19. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964) (concurring opinion). 
20. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964) (concurring opinion). 
See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion). 
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sion of ideas of any kind (as distinguished from conduct) ... .''21 And 
since, in Black's view, the first amendment is made applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment, the states, too, have "vast 
power to regulate conduct but no power at all . . . to make the ex-
pression of views a crime.''22 
While Black and Douglas have never softened their stand, 
however, they have not been successful in persuading their colleagues 
on the Court to adopt their views. Of the Justices who are currently 
sitting on the Court, none but Black and Douglas themselves has ever 
endorsed their view. 
Justice Harlan's position, to which he has consistently adhered 
since propounding it in his dissent in Roth,23 is more complex than 
that shared by Douglas and Black. In the first place, Harlan re-
jects, as he always has, the doctrine that the fourteenth amendment 
incorporates, in any literal sense, the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.24 Rather, he insists that the restraints imposed on the federal 
government by the first amendment may differ substantially from 
those imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment. In 
Harlan's view, "[f]ederal suppression of allegedly obscene matter 
should ... be constitutionally limited to that often described as 'hard-
core pornography.' "25 He does not attempt to justify even this de-
gree of federal censorship in terms of standards which are applicable 
to other categories of speech; he merely notes offhandedly that "[t]he 
Federal Government may be conceded a limited interest in excluding 
from the mails such gross pornography, almost universally con-
demned in this country."26 
But while tolerating federal censorship only of "hard-core por-
nography," Harlan would apply a different standard to the states 
under the fourteenth amendment. He has described that standard 
21. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
22. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (dissenting opinion). See also 
cases cited note 20 supra. 
23. 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (1957). See Ginsberg v. New York, and Interstate Circuit, 
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 629, 676, at 704-11 (1968) (concurring in the former 
and dissenting in the latter); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967) (separate opinion); 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (concurring opinion); Memoirs v. Mas-
sachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455-60 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
24. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (concurring opinion). 
25. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Ginz• 
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (dissenting opinion). For the definition 
of "hard-core pornography," Justice Harlan refers to Justice Stewart's description in 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
26. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
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in varying terms in his different opinions. In his concurring opinion 
in Alberts v. California,27 Harlan ·wrote: 
We can inquire only whether the state action so subverts the funda-
mental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause that it cannot be 
sustained as a rational exercise of power .... The States' power to 
make printed words criminal is, of course, confined by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but only insofar as such power is inconsistent 
with our concepts of "ordered liberty."28 
Having found that the California legislature had judged, notwith-
standing the conflict of scientific evidence, that printed words can 
deprave or corrupt one who reads them, Harlan determined "that 
it is not irrational, in our present state of knowledge, to consider 
that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state 
may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society."29 Moreover, 
Harlan found that, besides the prevention of illegal behavior, there 
were other interests which might be protected by a state prohibition 
of obscene materials, and that those interests were within the proper 
cognizance of state regulation.30 He therefore concluded: "I cannot 
say that the suppression [ of such materials] would so interfere with 
the communication of 'ideas' in any proper sense of that term that 
it would offend the Due Process Clause."31 In his dissenting opinion 
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, Harlan stated: "As to the states, I would make 
the federal test one of rationality."32 Explaining further, he said 
that he "would not prohibit [the states] ... from banning any ma-
terial which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state 
judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive 
manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such ma-
terial."33 Later, dissenting in .Memoirs v. Massachusetts, he said, 
"From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a 
State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted 
notion of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step 
27. Alberts was decided with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Harlan 
concurred in the judgment in Alberts although he dissented from the judgment in 
Roth. 
28. 354 U.S. at 501. In support of his conclusion, Justice Harlan cited Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324·25 (1937). 
29. 354 U.S. at 501-02. 
30. 354 U.S. at 502. 
31. 354 U.S. at 503. 
32. 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964). 
33. 378 U.S. at 204. 
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with current American standards."34 More recently, he has said that 
he "would withhold the federal judicial hand from interfering with 
state determinations except in instances where the state action clearly 
appears to be but the product of prudish overzealousness."35 
Harlan, however, has been no more successful than Black and 
Douglas have been in persuading other Justices to accept his point 
of view: On their face, the cases claim continuing loyalty to Roth. 
Whether that seeming loyalty is anything more than superficial is 
the question which must now be answered. 
B. The Emergent Symphony 
I. Roth and Its Progeny 
Having held iQ. Roth that "obscenity" is excluded from constitu-
tional protection, the Court was faced with the task of defining that 
term. In Roth, the Court ventured the following definition: "Ob-
scene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing 
to prurient interest.''36 To make the standard more precise, the 
Court adopted the following formulation of the test: "[W]hether to 
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest.''37 Justice Brennan, who wrote the Court's opinion in Roth, 
has taken the lead in developing obscenity doctrine in the subse-
quent cases. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,38 Brennan translated the test of the 
utter lack of "redeeming social importance," language which in Roth 
had seemed merely descriptive of obscenity,39 into a test of obscen-
ity vel non. He stated in Jacobellis: "obscenity is excluded from the 
constitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without redeem-
ing social importance' .... It follows that material dealing with 
sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . . or that has literary or 
scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, 
may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional 
protection.''40 Brennan further insisted in Jacobellis that the "con-
temporary community standards" aspect of the Roth test contem-
34. 383 U .s. 413, 458 (1966). 
35. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 708 (1968) (dissenting 
opinion). 
36. 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
37. 354 U.S. at 489. 
38. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
39. See 354 U.S. at 484. 
40. 378 U.S. at 191. 
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plated national, rather than local, community standarcls.41 Only 
Justice Goldberg was willing to endorse Brennan's opinion in 
Jacobellis, although four other members of the Court concurred 
with the result in separate opinions.42 Finally, in Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts,43 Justice Brennan again announced the judgment of the 
Court, and delivered an opinion in which he said that under the 
definition of obscenity established in Roth, 
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it 
must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the ma-
terial is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of 
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming so-
cial value.44 
On the same day on which he delivered his Memoirs opinion, 
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in Ginzburg v. United 
States,415 which drew its inspiration from Chief Justice Warren's con-
curring opinion in Roth. Warren had written: 
The defendants ... were engaged in the business of purveying 
textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic 
interest of their customers. They were plainly engaged in the com-
mercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for ma-
terials with prurient effect. I believe that the State and Federal Gov-
ernments can constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that 
these cases present to us, and that is all we need to decide.46 
Brennan took this "pandering" rationale, which Warren had of-
fered as an alternative to the Roth rationale, and incorporated it 
41. 378 U.S. at 192-95; cf. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
42. Justices Black and Stewart wrote separate opinions concurring in the result. 
Justice Douglas joined Black's opinion, and Justice White concurred in the result 
without opinion. 
43. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
44. 383 U.S. at 418. The lawyer who argued for Memoirs in the Supreme Court, 
and who deserves the greatest credit for the development of "social value" as an 
independent test of obscenity, has written an excellent book about his efforts, culmi-
nating in Memoirs, to establish that test. CHARLES REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 
(1968). Rembar's book docs more than describe the course of litigation ending with 
Memoirs. For the layman and beginning law student it provides some exceptionally 
good and understandable discussions of some difficult legal concepts; and for lawyers 
it affords considerable insight into the strategy of a successful advocate. 
When he concludes, however, that "In Memoirs the [social value] theory became 
a rule of law," (id. at 489) Rembar exaggerates the significance of Brennan's Memoirs 
opinion. Of the three Justices who endorsed that opinion, only Brennan himself now 
remains on the Court; and the endorsement of his value theory that Rembar finds in 
the separate opinions of Stewart, Harlan, and Douglas (see id. at 480-81) is anything 
but clear. 
45. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
46. 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957), quoted in 383 U.S. at 467. 
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into the Roth test itself, saying that "[w]here the purveyor's sole 
emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publication, 
that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity."47 He 
continued: 
It is important to stress that this analysis simply elaborates the test 
by which the obscenity vel non of the material must be judged. 
"Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is 
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation 
through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such 
evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene 
even though in other contexts the material would escape such con-
demnation.48 
Four Justices dissented in Ginzburg v. United States.49 Moreover, 
some of the Justices who silently concurred in Brennan's conclusion 
did not agree with his reasoning in Ginzburg, as their opinions in 
other cases make clear.50 In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, six of the 
Justices demurred to Brennan's reasoning, although some of them 
did concur in the result.51 Thus, Justice Brennan's formulation of 
the Roth test "as elaborated in subsequent cases" was subscribed to 
by only two of his colleagues: Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Fortas. Both Warren and Fortas have left the Court, and conse-
quently the only present Justice who has endorsed the Memoirs 
formulation is Justice Brennan himself. Even more significant, only 
three of the Justices who are now on the Court have genuinely en-
dorsed even the reasoning of Roth: Justices Brennan, White, and 
Stewart. Justice Stewart professes loyalty to Roth, but insists that 
obscenity must be limited in meaning to "hard-core pornography."02 
His brethren seem to feel that Justice Stewart's definition of ob-
scenity is "not dissimilar" to that propounded by Brennan in 
Memoirs,53 but Stewart himself found enough of a distinction that 
he refused to join in Brennan's Memoirs opinion and instead con-
47. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966). 
48. 383 U.S. at 475-76. 
49. Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart. 
50. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441-55 (1966) CTustice Clark, 
dissenting). It is never safe to assume that silent acquiescence in a majority opinion 
indicates an endorsement of anything more than the result reached. See \V. MURPHY, 
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY ch. 3 (1964). 
51. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined Brennan's opinion; Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred in the result in separate opinions. 
52. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Ginzburg 
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion). 
53. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967). 
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curred separately.54 Justice White also professes loyalty to Roth, but 
he dissented from the decision in Memoirs, and from Justice Bren-
nan's formulation of the Roth test in that case. White insists that 
"social importance" or "social value" under Roth "is not an inde-
pendent test of obscenity but is relevant only to determining the 
predominant prurient interest of the material .... "55 Justice 
Marshall, too, claims adherence to Roth, but in reality he has 
vitiated the fundamental holding of that case. Thus, even among 
the Justices who profess adherence to Roth, there is substantial dis-
agreement as to the meaning and application of the Roth test. All of 
the other incumbent Justices who are currently on the Court have 
flatly rejected Roth's basic proposition that obscenity is without con-
stitutional protection.56 
This writer's conviction that the bell has tolled for Roth rests, 
however, upon more than the simple observation that Roth's ad-
herents do not constitute a majority of the members of the present 
Court. The conviction is based primarily upon the reasoning which 
received the endorsement of a majority of the Justices in nvo recent 
obscenity cases: Ginsberg v. New York51 and Stanley v. Georgia.58 
2. Ginsberg v. New York 
There are three particular elements of the Roth obscenity 
doctrine which are challenged by the holding in Ginsberg v. New 
York. First, although there has been some dissent, 59 the adherents of 
Roth have generally agreed with Justice Brennan that the "con-
temporary community standards" aspect of the Roth test con-
templates the national community, not state and local communi-
ties. 00 Second, at least partially because of the first proposition, ad-
54. 383 U.S. 413, 421 (1966). 
55. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
56. No attempt has been made to determine the position of Chief Justice Burger 
on obscenity questions from his opinions in lower court cases. Whatever views he 
might have expressed in his former position, it is to be expected that as a Justice his 
views might change. He is no longer bound as a lower court judge, but may develop 
his own position on the questions as he chooses. 
57. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). This case should not be confused with Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See text accompanying notes 15-16, 45, 47, 49 supra. 
Ginsberg has been called "perhaps the final element in a relatively integrated con• 
cept of obscenity." Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's 
Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 153. This writer would rather call 
it the first element of a new doctrinal approach to obscenity. 
58. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
59. E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (Chief Justice Warren, 
joined by Justice Clark, dissenting). 
60. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964). 
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herents of the Roth test seem generally agreed with Justice Brennan 
that "[s ]ince it is only 'obscenity' that is excluded from the constitu-
tional protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene 
necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law";61 thus the 
question of the obscenity of materials cannot be left to the decision 
of state and lower federal courts, but the Supreme Court itself must 
shoulder the "difficult, recurring, and unpleasant task."62 Third, 
under Roth the possibility of harm resulting from obscenity is ir-
relevant. 63 In Roth, the Court explicitly rejected the harmfulness of 
materials as a criterion, observing that because obscenity is not pro-
tected speech, it is unnecessary to consider its relationship to harmful 
conduct.64 Ginsberg casts doubt upon each of these propositions. 
In Ginsberg v. New York, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of 
the Court, Justices Stewart and Harlan submitted separate concur-
ring opinions, and Justices Fortas, Black, and Douglas dissented. 
The departures from traditional Roth doctrine in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion are particularly interesting because Justice Brennan 
himself wrote the opinion in Roth and had fully accepted the Roth 
doctrine in his opinions in Jacobellis and Memoirs, and because 
his opinion in Ginsberg was joined by Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices White and Marshall, all of whom have professed loyalty to 
Roth.65 
Ginsberg involved a New York statute that prohibited the selling 
to minors of some pictures or publications which were "harmful to 
61. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964). 
62. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964). Here again, there has been some 
dissent. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202·03 (1964) (Chief Justice Warren, 
joined by Justice Clark, dissenting). But even Justice Harlan, who rejects the Roth test, 
agrees that it places the onus of decision on the Supreme Court. See his dissenting 
opinions in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 459-60 (1966), Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957). 
63. For a discussion of the disconnection of obscenity controls from apprehended 
harm, see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 391 (1963). 
64. 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957). It may be assumed that material which deals with 
sex, but which is not obscene, could be suppressed if it were, in Douglas' phrase, "so 
closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion). We may disregard the occasional 
overbroad statements indicating the contrary [e.g., "Our holding in Roth does not recog-
nize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene ••• ," 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)]. Nonobscene material dealing with sex 
surely has no greater protection, whether or not any less protection, than political 
expression. However, there have been no cases in which nonobscene material dealing 
with sex has been found so related to illegal action as to justify suppression on that 
ground. 
65. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's position, see text accompanying note 87 
infra. 
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minors."66 The phrase "harmful to minors" was defined by the 
statute in terms substantially equivalent to the criteria for obscenity 
which were endorsed in Justice Brennan's opinion in Memoirs,67 
except that each element of the statutory definition specifically re-
ferred to minors.68 The Supreme Court in affirming the conviction 
66. Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, [1965] 1 Laws of N.Y. 1066, as amended, N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1967), provides: 
Exposing minors to harmful materials 
1. Definitions. As used in this section: 
(a) "Minor" means any person under the age of seventeen years. 
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, 
pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of 
the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof 
below the to,p of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a dis-
cernibly turgid state. 
(c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual 
intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, 
pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast. 
(d) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female 
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal. 
(e) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a 
person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of 
being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so 
clothed. · 
(f) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or repre-
sentation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or 
sado-masochistic abuse, when it: 
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest 
of minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and 
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. 
(g) "Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or reason to know, 
or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of 
both: 
(i) the character and content of any material described herein which is 
reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and 
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake 
shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a 
reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor. 
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for mone-
tary consideration to a minor: 
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or 
similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body 
which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is 
harmful to minors, or 
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or 
sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) of sub• 
division two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative 
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and 
which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors. 
3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary 
consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or 
pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary consideration to premises 
whereon there is exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in 
whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and 
which is harmful to minors. 
4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor. 
67. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra. For a similar, but less careful, attempt 
to codify the language of Supreme Court obscenity cases, see Cain v. Commonwealth, 
437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky.), appeal docketed, 38 U.SL.W. 3095 (U.S. July 16, 1969) (No. 
347), construing KY. REv. STAT. § 436.101 (Supp. 1968). 
68. See note 66 supra. 
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of the defendant for violating the statute explicitly noted that "the 
'girlie' picture magazines involved in the sales here are not obscene 
for adults .... "69 The Court could have upheld this statute without 
the slightest compromise of Roth. It could have reasoned that 
the special interests of the state in protecting its children and in 
protecting parental control over their upbringing justify the sup-
pression, with regard to minors, of constitutionally protected ex-
pression, upon the application of a less rigorous test than the clear 
and present danger test. Such_ an approach is supported by precedent, 
as Justice Brennan seemed to recognize when he wrote, "[E]ven 
where there is an invasion of protected freedoms . . . the power of 
the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope 
of its authority over adults."70 
The Court, however, did not adopt that approach. Instead, 
Justice Brennan's opinion endorsed the concept of "variable ob-
scenity," under which material that could not constitutionally be pro-
hibited for adults may nonetheless be constitutionally suppressed as 
obscene with respect to minors.71 Such a holding was clearly not re-
quired; the statute did not use the term "obscenity,"72 and on the 
face of the statute the obscenity vel non of the material was not rele-
vant to conviction. But Justice Brennan regarded the statute as 
branding the defined material obscene for minors, and he was there-
fore led to compromise the doctrine of Roth. As he stated the issue: 
"Appellant's primary attack ... is leveled at the power of the State 
... to define the material's obscenity on the basis of its appeal to 
minors, and thus exclude material so defined from the area of pro-
tected expression. "73 
Under Roth, the ultimate determination of the obscenity vel non 
of any particular material was to be made by the Supreme Court; but 
in Ginsberg the Court held that the determination is to be made by 
the state legislature-at least when obscenity with respect to minors 
is at issue-subject only to the requirement that the Court must find 
the legislature's judgment rational.74 Moreover, according to Roth, 
obscenity was to be determined by reference to a national standard; 
but under Ginsberg, which permitted the definition of obscenity 
for minors to be made by the several state legislatures, variations 
69. 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968). 
70. 390 U.S. at 638, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
71. See 390 U.S. at 634-43. 
72. See note 66 supra. 
73. 390 U.S. at 635. 
74. 390 U.S. at 641-43. 
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from state to state in the definition of obscenity for minors are 
encouraged. Finally, while under Roth the harmfulness of the ob-
scene material was irrelevant, the Ginsberg Court approved the 
definition of obscenity for minors in terms of harm. The New York 
statute contained a legislative finding that the kind of material 
prohibited as to minors was "a basic factor in impairing the 
ethical and moral development of our youth."75 In that regard the 
Court stated: "To sustain state power to exclude materials defined 
as obscenity by § 484-h requires only that we be able to say that it was 
not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material 
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors."76 The point to be 
emphasized is not that the rational-basis test thus applied in the case 
of minors is less rigorous than a clear and present danger test, but 
rather that the Court regarded harm to minors as justifying classifica-
tion of material as obscene for them. Under Roth, the presence or 
absence of any prospective harm was irrelevant to obscenity; in 
Ginsberg, the possible harm to minors is the touchstone of obscenity 
for them. 
It is possible to regard Ginsberg v. New York as not affecting the 
fundamental premises of Roth obscenity doctrine, and as merely 
taking account of the special problems associated with minors. 
Certainly, Roth and the other earlier cases did not involve statutes 
specifically aimed at the protection of minors, so that Ginsberg can 
be technically distinguished from those holdings. However, the rea-
soning of Justice Brennan's opinion in Ginsberg deviates sharply 
from the propositions even he had announced in earlier cases, and, 
while those propositions were not addressed to the problem of pro-
tecting minors, they were on their face categorical. 
At the very least, Brennan's opinion in Ginsberg v. New York 
raises some embarrassing questions for proponents of Roth. I£ the 
power of the state to classify materials as obscene for minors depends 
upon the reasonableness of its finding that the materials in question 
are harmful to minors, the classification of the materials as obscene 
does not seem to give the state any greater power to suppress them 
than it would have if the concept of obscenity were discarded. Even 
75. Law of April 29, 1955, ch. 548, § 2, [1955] 2 Laws of N.Y. 1988 [formerly codi-
fied in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (McKinney App. 1967)]. The legislature had also 
declared that such material is "a clear and present danger to the people of the state." 
But the Court held that, since obscenity is not protected expression, it could be 
"suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase 
'clear and present danger' in its application to protected speech." 390 U.S. at 641, 
citing Roth. 
76. 390 U.S. at 641. 
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in the case of protected freedoms, as the Court itself noted in Gins-
berg, the state may interfere more readily when minors are concerned 
than it may in the case of adults.77 On its face, the New York statute 
at stake in Ginsberg seems to have been premised on that view, since 
it did not label the materials as "obscene," but rather suppressed 
them because they were found to be "harmful to minors." Further-
more, insofar as the case recognizes harm to minors as a touchstone 
of obscenity for minors, it adds a new dimension to obscenity doc-
trine. However different the standard of proof of harm might be-
clear and present danger or whatever-if it could be proved that 
some material not meeting the constitutional standards for obscenity 
set out in Roth and its progeny is nevertheless harmful to adults, 
might it be held to be "obscene"? And if some material may be sup-
pressed as obscene upon a sufficient showing of harm to adults, what 
is accomplished by classifying that material as obscene? Such material 
could be suppressed even though not obscene, under the clear and 
present danger test or whatever variation of that test is to be applied 
in the case of nonobscene speech.78 Conversely, if harm is the touch-
stone of obscenity, what justification is there for the suppression ot 
materials whicli do satisfy the constitutional tests of Roth and its 
progeny, but cannot be shown to be harmful? Finally, insofar as 
Ginsberg v. New York holds that a legislature may adjust the defini-
tion of obscenity when children are concerned, the Court has com-
promised traditional obscenity doctrine by recognizing the need to 
weigh the interest in free speech against the legitimate interest of 
the state in safeguarding its youth; and if protection of youth 
is a substantial interest that may outweigh the interest in protection 
of speech, there may well be other interests which could have a 
similar effect. In Roth, the Court had treated obscenity as a distinct 
class of expression, excluded from constitutional protection, and not 
to be judged as to its suppressibility by the same standards which are 
applied to other classes of expression. In Ginsberg there was a 
radical change; while the case dealt with the special situation of 
minors, the Court in effect applied the same sort of standards that it 
might apply to determine the suppressibility of any other class of 
speech. 
3. Stanley v. Georgia 
The requiem which began with Ginsberg continued with 
Stanley v. Georgia. In Stanley, the Court's opinion rested upon 
77. See note 70 supra. 
78. See text accompanying notes 127-48 infra. 
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the assumed premise that the films in question were obscene.79 How-
ever, notwithstanding the unqualified proposition of Roth that 
obscenity is not protected expression, 80 the Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction for knowing possession of obscene matter. Roth 
was distinguished from Stanley on its facts, and the Court insisted 
that "Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by 
today's holding."81 The Court noted that Roth and the other cases 
dealt with materials which were being disseminated or distributed; 
Stanley, on the other hand, involved "mere private possession of 
obscene matter."82 The Court acknowledged that the Roth declara-
tion that obscenity is not protected was on its face unqualified, but 
held that it must nevertheless be read in the context of the facts in 
that case, and could not operate mechanically to decide a case of 
mere private possession. The Court stated: "Roth and its progeny 
certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem 
of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in every con-
text, be insulated from all constitutional protections."83 According 
to the Court, Roth and the cases following it discerned an im-
portant state interest in regulating the commercial distribution of 
obscene material; but the facts in Stanley, the Court held, disclosed 
even more important, private interests which must be protected. 
Stanley, the Court noted, 
is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right 
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his 
own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into 
the contents of his library .... If the First Amendment means any-
thing, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he 
79. In this case, the authorities secured a warrant to search Stanley's home for 
evidence of alleged bookmaking activities. In the course of their search, they came 
upon three rolls of movie film in a desk drawer. Using a projector and screen also 
found in the home, they viewed the films, and, concluding that they were obscene, 
seized them and commenced a prosecution for knowing possession of obscene matter 
in violation of Georgia law. 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969). Although the Court might have 
reversed Stanley's conviction on the ground that the films had been illegally seized 
and should not have been admitted into evidence [see 394 U.S. at 569-72 Oustice 
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and White, concurring in the result)], the ma• 
jority chose to rest its decision on the obscenity question (394 U.S. at 559). Since the 
defendant did not argue on appeal that the films were not in fact obscene, the Court 
assumed for purposes of its decision that they were. 394 U.S. at 559 n.2. 
BO. See text accompanying note 4 supra. 
81. 394 U.S. at 568. 
82. 394 U.S. at 561. 
83. 394 U.S. at 563. 
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may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought 
of giving government the power to control men's minds.84 
The opinion of the Court in the Stanley case was written by 
Justice Marshall. It was joined, however, by Justices Douglas and 
Harlan, each of whom has consistently and persistently rejected the 
Roth test; and it was not joined by Justices Stewart, Brennan, and 
White, all of whom have been consistent adherents of Roth.85 In this 
circumstance, the pallid claim that "Roth and the cases following 
that decision are not impaired by today's holding" cannot be given 
much weight.86 The fact is that the reasoning in Stanley is quite 
inconsistent with what Roth had been thought to have held. On its 
face, Roth made no allowance for interests which might be adverse 
to the interest in controlling obscenity; it held flatly that obscenity 
was not protected. But in Stanley the Court reinterpreted Roth 
merely to recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with ob-
scenity. While on the facts of the previous cases this interest was 
not outweighed by any competing interest, in Stanley it was out-
weighed by the interest in an individual's privacy and freedom to 
view what he pleases, even the admittedly obscene, in his mm home. 
This balancing of competing interests is reminiscent of the approach 
which has typically been taken by the Court in cases involving the 
suppression of nonobscene publications.87 
The state argued in Stanley that the prohibition of private pos-
session of obscene materials was justified because "exposure to ob-
scene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of 
sexual violence."88 The Court did not say that a sufficient showing of 
a cause and effect relationship between obscenity and deviant be-
havior could not justify such a statute; it held merely that "[g]iven 
the present state of knowledge" the evidence of cause and effect was 
not sufficient.89 In other words, the circumstances that would make 
the clear and present danger test applicable were not present. In 
Roth, the clear and present danger test had been dismissed as 
84. 394 U.S. at 565. 
85. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White joined in a concurring opinion which 
declined to reach the obscenity question and argued for reversal of the conviction 
on search and seizure grounds. 394 U.S. at 569-72. 
86. The considerations of strategy that might explain the willingness of a Justice 
to concur in an opinion that contains language to which he might not fully sub-
scribe are explored, with valuable insight, in w. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY ch. 3 (1964). 
87. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For more recent cases adopt-
ing this approach, see notes 159-63 infra. 
88. 394 U.S. at 566. 
89. 394 U.S. at 567. 
December 1969) Requiem for Roth 201 
irrelevant to obscenity on the ground that obscenity was outside 
constitutional protection.90 Again the Court distinguished Roth as 
not involving the competing interest present in Stanley.91 But 
Stanley left open the possibility that a showing of clear and present 
danger might justify suppression even of mere private possession of 
obscene matter. If, as Stanley suggested, Roth merely recognized a 
state interest in the control of obscenity, which must be balanced 
against other interests, perhaps we cannot say that the clear and 
present danger test does not apply to obscenity because obscenity is 
unprotected. Perhaps instead we must say that in view of the state 
interest in controlling obscenity, and absent any greater counter-
vailing interest, meeting a lesser standard than clear and present 
danger would be sufficient to justify suppression; but if a sufficient 
countervailing interest is present, suppression of even the admittedly 
"obscene" would be unconstitutional without proof of clear and 
present danger. That, of course, is not at all what Roth said; but it 
is, in effect, what the Court now has said in Stanley. 
The recognition that other interests may, under any circum-
stances, compete against the suppression of obscenity cuts at the very 
foundation of the Roth rule. To say that obscenity is without con-
stitutional protection is very different from saying that the govern-
ment has an interest in controlling obscenity-an interest which, 
however, must be balanced against other interests. To accept the lat-
ter formulation is to treat obscenity as subject to the same considera-
tions that the Court has employed with respect to other classes of 
speech.92 
II. COMPLETING THE UNFINISHED SYMPHONY 
A. Incorporation of the First Amendment by the Fourteenth 
The general conclusion which this writer has drawn, from the 
attrition in the ranks of Roth's adherents on the Court and even 
more from the recent Ginsberg v. New York and Stanley v. Georgia 
opinions, is that the fundamental holding of the Roth case-that 
obscenity is a discrete class of expression, excluded from the con-
stitutional protection guaranteed to other kinds of expression and 
therefore to be treated differently from other kinds of expression-
has already met its demise. It remains to consider what better avenue 
90. 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957). 
91. 394 U.S. at 567. 
92. See text accompanying notes 127-58 infra. 
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of constitutional approach to the obscenity problem might be open 
to the Court. 
It is the first amendment which inhibits national interference 
with the freedom of expression, but it is the fourteenth amendment 
which inhibits interference with that freedom by the states; and 
there are good grounds for arguing that the degree of inhibition is 
not the same.93 
The proposition that the Bill of Rights guarantees are in-
corporated into the fourteenth amendment and thus applied against 
the states has muddied the waters of constitutional jurisprudence for 
three decades-ever since Justices Black and Douglas joined the 
Court. Each of these Justices brought with him to the Court a 
strong distaste for the kind of judicial obstructionism which had 
resulted from the Court's assumption of legislative policy functions 
under the undefined "due process" clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, and each was convinced that to avoid obstruc-
tionism the scope of "due process" must somehow be confined. Con-
sequently, each endorsed the proposition that the phrase "due 
process of law" in the fourteenth amendment was intended as 
a shorthand reference to the guarantees of the Bill of Rights--neither 
more nor less.94 
There is considerable irony in the history of the Black-Douglas 
"incorporation" doctrine. The doctrine originated in reaction 
against the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process concepts, 
under both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, to invalidate 
economic and social legislation of both the states and Congress.95 
However, unless the adherents of the doctrine contend that fifth as 
well as fourteenth amendment "due process" is exhausted by the list 
of specifics in the Bill of Rights-a contention which would make 
the fifth amendment due process clause meaninglessly redundant-
the doctrine does nothing to prevent continued abuse in the Court's 
treatment of federal legislation. Moreover, since the fifth as well as 
the other amendments constituting the Bill of Rights is incorporated 
into the fourteenth, the undefined due process clause of the fifth 
amendment, with its potential for judicial abuse, remains applicable 
to the states precisely because of incorporation. But the doctrine's 
93. See text accompanying notes 127-67 infra. 
94. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-72 (1947) (Justice Black, joined by 
Justice Douglas, dissenting). 
95. For examples of this use of due process, see Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 
(1928); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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inability to provide the desired protection against obstructionist 
application of the undefined due process clause96 is not the only irony. 
The doctrine arose as a result of concern over substantive due 
process; but its significance has been greatest in the field of pro-
cedural due process. During the last thirty years, one after another 
of the procedural guarantees contained in the second through eighth 
amendments has been held to be an element of fourteenth amend-
ment due process; and the opinions in some of the cases have spoken 
in the language of incorporation.97 But the substantive rights pro-
tected by the first amendment against congressional abridgment had 
been held protected by the fourteenth amendment against state 
infringement long before Black and Douglas came to the bench 
with their incorporation doctrine.98 Moreover, the doctrine which 
has effectively ended the abuse of substantive due process-an abuse 
that incorporation was intended to end-has developed under both 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments independent of the incorpora-
tion doctrine.99 
Despite the use in some majority opinions of the language of in-
corporation, no majority of the Court has ever genuinely endorsed 
the incorporation doctrine of Justices Douglas and Black.100 The 
most accurate characterization of the Court's actual approach is 
perhaps that recently tendered by the Court through Justice White 
-that in developing the procedural due process requirements of the 
fourteenth amendment, "the Court has looked increasingly to the 
Bill of Rights for guidance."101 The literal incorporation doctrine, 
which would apply the Bill of Rights guarantees as such to the states, 
96. The incorporation of the fifth amendment's due process clause is not the only 
reason that the incorporation theory of the fourteenth amendment fails to insure 
restraint. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
97. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
98. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmer-
man, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Later cases explicitly included the freedom of religion 
[Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)] and reaffirmed the inclusion of freedom 
of assembly [De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)]. 
99. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express Agency, 
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See 
also Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951). 
100. "A few members of the Court have taken the position that the intention of 
those who drafted the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was simply, and 
exclusively, to make the provisions of the first eight Amendments applicable to state 
action. [Citations to Justice Black.] This view has never been accepted by this Court." 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) Oustice Harlan, joined by Justice 
Stewart, dissenting). 
101. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). 
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seems ultimately destined to fade from the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court with the passing in due time of its principal ad-
vocates, Justices Black and Douglas, a casualty of the free competition 
in ideas which Justices Black and Douglas themselves, to their 
eternal credit, have so stoutly defended.102 
But even if it were conceded that the phrase "due process of 
102. The distinction between the Black-Douglas literal incorporation doctrine 
and the different doctrine which emerges from the Court's state criminal procedure 
decisions since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is very important. The literal in-
corporation doctrine holds that fourteenth amendment due process means the Bill of 
Rights, as such. By contrast, the doctrine articulated with increasing clarity in the 
recent opinions holds that fourteenth amendment due process means procedures that 
are "fundamental ••. that is ... necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered 
liberty," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968), and that courts, in de-
fining these fundamental procedures, should "look ..• to the Bill of Rights for guid-
ance." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148, 149 n.14 (1968). That doctrine may ap-
propriately be called the "guidance" doctrine. Considering a uniform conception of 
American justice more important than federal diversity, it imposes those fundamental 
procedures which happen to be enumerated in the Bill of Rights equally upon federal 
and state governments: "Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 
'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' .•• the same constitutional standards 
apply against both the State and Federal Governments." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 795 (1969). Unlike the literal incorporation doctrine, however, the "guidance" 
doctrine leaves open the dual possibilities that some provisions of the Bill of Rights 
might not be fundamental, and thus not inhere in fourteenth amendment due process, 
and that some procedures not enumerated in the Bill of Rights might nevertheless 
be fundamental and thus required by due process. Illustrative of the latter possibility 
is North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), in which a majority of the Court, 
over Justice Black's predictable dissent, held that while the double jeopardy provision 
of the Bill of Rights, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's 
due process clause, did not preclude a heavier penalty upon conviction at a second 
trial, nevertheless the concept of due process itself-without reference to the Bill of 
Rights-could and in Pearce's case did. Both the Black-Douglas literal incorporation 
doctrine and the different doctrine emerging from the recent cases are at odds with 
the due process methodology represented by Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 
(1937), and still endorsed by Justice Harlan [see, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 807-13 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 
337, 342-44 (1969) (concurring opinion)]. 
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), Justice Douglas wrote 
the opinion for the Court holding unconstitutional a Wisconsin garnishment statute 
which permitted the taking of an employee's wages without notice and a prior hear-
ing. No specific provision of the Bill of Rights was held violated; rather, Douglas 
and the Court merely stated that "this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates 
the fundamental principles of due process." 395 U.S. at 342. Justice Black dissented 
precisely because the statute offended no specific provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Douglas and the majority found that the case involved a fundamental requirement of 
fourteenth amendment due process which was not among the specifics of the Bill of 
Rights. Again in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, while Douglas did find the double 
jeopardy clause sufficient in itself to decide the case, he added specifically, "I agree 
with the Court as to the reach of due process." 395 U.S. at 726. His opinion for the 
Court in Sniadach and his concurrence in Pearce raise the question whether Douglas 
himself is going "soft" on the Black-Douglas literal incorporation doctrine. Douglas, 
of course, could answer that he still holds to literal incorporation, but that the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth and that 
the fifth amendment clause guarantees, inter alia, the rights protected in Sniadach and 
Pearce. This reply would illustrate the irony of the literal incorporation doctrine 
already pointed out in the text accompanying notes 95-96 supra. 
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law" in the fourteenth amendment incorporates the procedural 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights and applies them against the states, it 
is still possible that there would be different standards for state and 
federal suppression of speech. Well before either Justice Black or 
Justice Douglas had risen to the bench, the Supreme Court had 
already established that the "first amendment freedoms" were 
secured against the states by the fourteenth amendment.103 Those 
freedoms were held included, however, not as elements of the "due 
process" without which life, liberty, and property could not be 
abridged, but rather as elements of the "liberty" which the four-
teenth amendment said could not be abridged except by due 
process.104 Controversy over the Black-Douglas incorporation doc-
trine has obscured this essential distinction. Black and Douglas 
might say that a state infringement of rights of expression admittedly 
protected by the first amendment is a denial of "due process"; but 
the cases which held the first amendment freedoms protected by 
the fourteenth regarded such infringements as admitted violations 
of protected "liberty" and went on to inquire whether the admitted 
violations were justified because they were consistent with due 
process. A close look at those cases will bear this analysis ·out. 
The first case to hold that freedom of speech is among the 
liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment was Gitlow v. New 
York,105 in which the Supreme Court sustained a New York statute 
prohibiting the advocacy of criminal anarchy. The Court did not 
resort to the expedient of excluding this class of expression from 
constitutional protection-an expedient that later would be used in 
cases involving libel1°6 and obscenity.107 There was no denial that 
the statute deprived defendants of protected rights of expression; 
rather, the Court, giving considerable weight to the judgment of the 
state legislature, held that the statute was not "an arbitrary or un-
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably 
infringing the freedom of speech or press."108 The Court's statement 
uses the familiar language of due process, which the Court was con-
sistently using in that era, as it had in the past, in cases under the 
fourteenth amendment which involved admitted infringements of 
103. Sec note 98 supra. 
104. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
105. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
106. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
107. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
108. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (emphasis added). 
206 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:185 
other liberties than the freedom of speech.109 What the majority did 
in Gitlow was not to endorse a so-called "bad tendency" test for in-
terpretation of the first amendment,110 but rather to apply in the case 
of state regulation the traditional fourteenth amendment due 
process test. 
Similarly, in Whitney v. California111 and Fiske v. Kansas,112 the 
Court referred to the standards of due process in order to determine 
the constitutionality of admitted state infringements of protected 
speech. In both cases protected rights were infringed, but there were 
factual differences between them bearing on the arbitrariness or 
reasonableness of the infringements. In Whitney the infringement 
was held to be consistent with due process,113 while in Fiske· the in-
fringement was held to violate due process.114 The next year, in New 
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,115 the Court confronted the 
claim that New York had unconstitutionally deprived a person of 
liberty to belong to an unincorporated association. That this liberty 
was protected by the fourteenth amendment and that New York had 
taken it away was admitted; but since the Court found the depriva-
tion of liberty to be reasonably related to a legitimate state objec-
tive, it sustained the deprivation as consistent with due process.116 
109. See, e.g., cases cited note 95 supra. See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 
(1898); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-
63 (1887). In cases involving economic regulations, the Court from 1890 (Minnesota 
Rate Case, 134 U.S. 418) until 1934 (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502) stood ready to 
overrule legislative judgments on the question of reasonableness versus arbitrariness; but 
whatever the degree of deference to legislative judgment, the requirement of reason-
ableness is a due process concept. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) 
(holding Congress to a reasonableness standard under the fifth amendment's due 
process clause). 
110. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 909-10 (1963). 
lll. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
112. 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
113. "We cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbi-
trary exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right 
of free speech, assembly or association •••• " 274 U.S. at 372. 
114. The Court held that the statute, as applied, was "an arbitrary and unreason-
able exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty 
of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 274 U.S. at 387. 
115. 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 
116. 278 U.S. at 72-73: 
The relator's contention under the due process clause is that the statute deprives 
him of liberty in that it prevents him from exercising his right of membership 
in the association. But his liberty in this regard, like most other personal rights, 
must yield to the rightful exertion of the police power. There can be no doubt 
that under that power the State may prescribe and apply to associations having 
an oath-bound membership any reasonable regulation calculated to confine their 
purposes and activities within limits which are consistent with the rights of 
others and the public welfare. The requirement in § 53 that each association 
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Taken together, Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, and Zimmerman stand for 
the proposition that a state may infringe protected liberties, but may 
not infringe them "unreasonably" or "unwarrantably." 
The approach of these early cases, protecting so-called "first 
amendment freedoms" from state infringement, should not be care-
lessly dismissed as archaic. Admittedly, it is not the approach which 
prevails on the face of more recent opinions. It is an approach, 
however, which has been obscured and then forgotten, rather than 
deliberately rejected. Near the close of the 1968 term, on June 9, 
1969, the Supreme Court observed that Whitney v. California "has 
been thoroughly discredited by later decisions," and held per curiam 
without dissent that Whitney is overruled.117 What was deliberately 
rejected, however, was not the due process methodology of Whitney 
and the other early cases discussed above; that aspect of Whitney 
received no mention in the 1969 case. What was rejected was Whit-
ney's conclusion that a criminal syndicalism statute was constitu-
tionally valid despite its failure to distinguish between advocacy and 
incitement-a distinction which decisions subsequent to Whitney 
had determined must be made. Thus it remains true that the tradi-
tional due process approach of the early cases to problems of state in-
fringement of first amendment freedoms has never been deliberately 
rejected. Nonetheless, that older approach has not been openly 
followed in more recent cases; and if it is to be argued that such an 
approach has-or should have-continued vitality, then the factors 
accounting for its obscuration must be explored. 
The doctrine of Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, and Zimmerman was 
reaffirmed in 1931 in Near v. Minnesota.118 Speaking again in tradi-
tional due process terms, the Court in Near explicitly stated that the 
fourteenth amendment restraint on state interference with protected 
expression is not absolute.m One theme of due process doctrine prior 
to Near had been that, while a large degree of regulation infringing 
protected liberties to accomplish police power ends was permitted, 
the due process clause precluded any regulation which destroyed the 
shall file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, oath of 
membership, etc., with a list of members and officers • • • is not arbitrary or 
oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be of real effect. Of course, power to 
require the disclosure includes authority to prevent individual members of an 
association which has failed to comply from attending meetings or retaining 
membership with knowledge of its default. We conclude that the due process 
clause is not violated. 
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
118. 283 U.S. 697, 707. 
119. 283 U.S. at 707-08. 
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"essence" of a protected liberty.120 After alluding to that principle, 
the Court in Near continued: "Liberty, in each of its phases, has its 
history and connotation and, in the present instance, the inquiry is 
as to the historic conception of the liberty of the press and whether 
the statute under review violates the essential attributes of that 
liberty."121 Thus, when Near was decided, there was a clearly recog-
nized difference between the question whether a given liberty was 
protected, and the due process question whether an infringement of 
the protected liberty violated "the essential attributes of that liberty." 
That period in the Court's history was the heyday of substantive due 
process, and it was often by answer to the latter question that 
the Court struck down legislation which was found to eviscerate 
liberties that it admitted were subject to less destructive restraints.122 
Within a few years after Near, however, due process adjudication 
changed; even the cases cited by the Near Court in framing the due 
process issue were explicitly overruled.123 Near, like Gitlow, Whit-
ney, Fiske, and Zimmerman, had applied to state infringements of 
protected freedoms of speech, press, and association the same due 
process standard that the Court had been applying to state infringe-
ments of business and economic liberties. But now it was held that 
when infringements upon the latter sort of liberties are in issue, 
due process required not reasonableness as assessed by the Court's 
own judgment, nor the integrity of judicially defined "essentials" 
of those liberties, but merely a rational basis for the legislative find-
ing that the infringement was reasonably related to the accomplish-
ment of some legitimate objective.124 
No person who values the fundamental freedoms of expression 
120. The examples given in Near, 283 U.S. at 707-08, were that an owner could 
not be deprived of the right to a fair return, since that right is of the essence of 
ownership [Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 596 (1915); Railroad 
Commn. Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886)], and that while legislation may regulate con-
tractual activity [Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 161, 165 (1895)], it may not inter• 
£ere with the indispensable essentials of liberty of contract [Ribnik v. McBride, 277 
U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927): Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923)]. See also Hurtado v. California, IIO U.S. 516, 
532 (1884), in which the Court stated that the fourteenth amendment "must be held 
to guarantee ..• the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property." 
121. 283 U.S. at 708. 
122. See, e.g., cases cited note 120 supra. 
123. The Court in Near cited Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), and the 
precedents which that case had followed, Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 
(1927), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 283 U.S. at 708. 
Adkins was explicitly overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 
400 (1937). Tyson and Ribnik were severely curtailed in Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502, 537 (1934), and Ribnik was later explicitly overruled, necessarily carry• 
ing T)•son with it in its demise, in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). 
124. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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secured by the first and fourteenth amendments could countenance 
applying such a "minimum rationality" test to determine the legit-
imacy of state infringements upon those paramount liberties. Yet to 
continue disposing of state speech and press cases in a manner con-
sistent with the cases from Gitlow to Near would be to raise again 
the specter of judicial obstructionism through the concept of sub-
stantive due process. The dilemma could have been resolved by 
carefully distinguishing between the appropriate use of traditional 
substantive due process doctrine and the obstructionist use to which 
that doctrine had been put in the cases of economic and social legisla-
tion.125 But in the years after the bitter constitutional struggles of 
the New Deal era, there was little tolerance for any approach which 
even faintly resembled the repudiated obstructionist economic due 
process doctrine. Therefore, a different escape from the apparent 
dilemma had to be found. If the approach taken by the Court in 
Near could not be followed, and yet could not be flatly rejected, it 
had to be reinterpreted; and so it was. Near had inquired whether 
the state action which had infringed the protected liberty violated "the 
essential attributes of that liberty."126 With the demise of obstruc-
tionist substantive due process, the distinction between that question 
and the question whether a particular liberty was protected was 
easily overlooked. Attention was diverted from the due process issue, 
as it had been framed in the earlier cases, to the question whether a 
given example or class of expression was protected by the constitu-
tional guaranty of freedom of expression. 
B. Protected Liberty and Due Process 
If the content of fourteenth amendment "liberty," as it regards 
speech, is defined by reference to the first amendment, then whatever 
is excluded from the protection of the latter must also be excluded 
from the former. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " 
On its face, this prohibition is absolute; but it has never been au-
thoritatively construed to prohibit all congressional interference 
with all expression under all circumstances and at all times. Certain 
classes of expression have been held to be excluded from the first 
amendment concept of protected expression; this was true for a time 
of libel,127 and it was true of obscenity under Roth. As to other kinds 
125. Such a distinction is articulated in the text accompanying notes 195-200 infra. 
126. 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). 
127. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see Kalven, The New York Times 
210 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:185 
of expression, the classic formulation of the protection afforded by 
the first amendment is based upon Justice Holmes' statement in 
Schenck v. United States: 128 "The question in every case is whether 
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a na-
ture as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a ques-
tion of proximity and degree."129 In subsequent opinions, Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis argued that the proximity must be great and 
that the substantive evils feared must be substantial.130 Later opin-
ions have suggested that the constitutional protection varies with 
the substantiality of the substantive evils feared, with the proximity 
of their relationship to the expression, or with both.131 
Justice Holmes' statement in Schenck is typical of the eloquent 
imprecision characteristic of his opinions. He does not make clear 
whether the clear and present danger doctrine is an exception to 
the provision that there shall be "no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech," or whether it is a limitation upon the concept of "free-
dom of speech." He does not indicate whether, when Congress out-
laws sufficiently dangerous speech, it is abridging-but constitution-
ally-the "freedom of speech," or whether, instead, there is no 
abridgement because such dangerous speech is outside the constitu-
tional concept of "speech."132 The distinction is highly significant 
for first amendment doctrine respecting congressional power. As if 
this imprecision were not enough, Holmes and Brandeis confounded 
things further in s~bsequent cases. Schenck involved only the first 
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP, CT. R.Ev. 
191, 217-18. But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
128. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
129. 249 U.S. at 52. Justices Douglas and Black would eliminate even the clear 
and present danger exception to the first amendment. Brandenburg v .. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 449-57 (1969) (concurring opinions). 
130. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (dissenting opinion). 
131. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
132. Under either of these views, the clear and present danger test or its variations 
would arguably apply as fully to the fourteenth amendment as to the first. If "speech" 
in the first amendment is defined to exclude speech which presents a clear and 
present danger, it is that restricted concept of speech which is contained in the 
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, if "speech" 
is a broad term, including dangerous speech, but legislation abridging it is per-
missible as an exception to the "no law" prohibition of the first amendment, it is 
arguable that what is included in fourteenth amendment "liberty" is not "freedom 
of speech" but rather the first amendment right to have "no law" passed "abridging 
the freedom of speech." Under the latter view, the exceptions to the "no law" prohibi-
tion of the first amendment would be integral to fourteenth amendment liberty 
regarding speech. 
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amendment, but Gitlow was decided on fourteenth amendment due 
process grounds.133 Yet in Gitlow, Holmes dissented, joined by Bran-
deis, urging application of the clear and present danger test.134 
The inference arises that this test, initially fashioned under the first 
amendment-which contains no due process clause- was now being 
urged as the applicable criterion of due process of law. The validity 
of that inference is confirmed by Justice Brandeis' concurring opin-
ion in Whitney, in which Justice Holmes joined. The majority in 
Whitney deferred to the legislature on the due process question of 
the reasonableness of the infringement of speech there involved. 
Brandeis construed that deferral as an abrogation to the state legis-
lature of the decision whether a clear and present danger was pre-
sented, 185 and he contended that this decision should be reserved to 
the Supreme Court. To support his contention, Brandeis was obliged 
to make an analogy to the aberrational line of obstructionist cases136 
in which the Court had departed from older due process doctrine137 
and had decided the due process question on its own assessment of 
the reasonableness of economic legislation, in derogation of the legis-
lators' judgment.1as 
Even before last term, when Whitney was expressly overruled,139 
there was, as the Court stated in 1951, "little doubt that subse-
quent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis ra-
tionale."140 Regrettably, however, the subsequent opinions have 
done no better than Justices Holmes and Brandeis themselves in 
clarifying the significance of the clear and present danger test. If 
l!l!l. See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra. 
1!14. 268 U.S. 652, 672-7!1 (1925). 
1!15. 274 U.S. !157, !174 (concurring opinion): 
It is said to be the function of the legislature to determine whether at a par-
ticular time and under the particular circumstances the formation of, or assembly 
with, a society organized to advocate criminal syndicalism constitutes a clear and 
present danger of substantive evil; and that by enacting the law here in question 
the legislature of California determined that question in the affirmative. 
1!16. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Minnesota Rate Case, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); cases cited by 
Brandeis, 274 U.S. at 374 n.l. 
137. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 
(1877); text accompanying notes 202-05 infra. 
1!18. 274 U.S. 357, 374 {1927) (concurring opinion): 
Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly been held invalid, because unnecessary, 
where the denial of liberty involved was that of engaging in a particular busi-
ness. The power of the courts to strike down an offending law is no less when 
the interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal 
rights of free speech and assembly. 
139. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); text accompanying note 117 
supra. 
140. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951). 
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that test is offered, as in Gitlow and Whitney, as the standard of 
fourteenth amendment due process, how does it apply to the 
first amendment, which permits no due process infringement but 
flatly provides that no law may abridge the freedom of speech? 
If the test provides an exception to the "no law" prohibition, it may 
exclude certain utterances from protection under either the first or 
the fourteenth amendment;141 but then it contains grave implica-
tions for our security from federal suppression,142 and leaves unde-
fined the factors which might justify, as consistent with due process, 
state infringements of protected freedoms. If it defines a boundary 
between protected and unprotected expression, it clearly applies to 
both amendments;143 but again, it leaves undefined the circumstances 
under which states may infringe the protected freedoms in accor-
dance with due process. 
Because the clear and present danger test originated under the 
first amendment, and because it, or variations of it, have been reg-
ularly applied to federal as well as to state legislation,144 the test 
cannot be regarded as a test of due process. The first amendment on 
its face imposes a higher standard of protection than does the due 
process clause, and it is to that higher standard that the clear and 
present danger test provides an exception. Thus, while we may agree 
with Holmes and Brandeis that infringements of liberty should be 
restrained, and, while we may agree as well that the majorities in 
Gitlow and Whitney provided too little restraint,145 the contention 
that clear and present danger is a due process test cannot be accepted. 
Clear and present danger excludes some speech and writing from 
constitutional protection, but state infringements consistent with 
due process are contemplated by the fourteenth amendment even as 
to protected expression. 
The question remains, however, whether the clear and present 
danger test is an exception to the first amendment's "no law" pro-
hibition or an exclusion of certain types of expression from the def-
inition of freedom of speech and press. If it is viewed as an exception 
to the "no law" prohibition, it invites a proliferation of exceptions, 
and ultimately leads to what Justice Frankfurter hailed as the "weigh-
ing of competing interests."146 There is considerable force in Justice 
141. See note 132 supra. 
142. See text accompanying notes 146-47 infra. 
143. See note 132 supra. 
144. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
145. For a discussion of the due process standard, see text accompanying notes 
196-219 infra. 
146. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519, 525 (1951) (concurring opinion). 
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Black's protest that such an approach "waters down the First Amend-
ment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to 
Congress."147 Moreover, it is a naked amendment of the constitu-
tional language, which on its face is unequivocal and without excep-
tion: "no law." 
On the other hand, "the freedom of speech ... [ and] the press" is 
language on its face imprecise the meaning of which must be defined 
by history and judicial construction. If the clear and present danger 
doctrine is viewed as a partial definition of those freedoms, judges 
are not left wholly at large to balance competing interests. Accord-
ing to that view, 
The command of the first amendment is "absolute" in the sense 
that "no law" which "abridges" "the freedom of speech" is constitu-
tionally valid .... [I]t insists on focusing the inquiry upon the defini-
tion of "abridge," "the freedom of speech," and if necessary "law," 
rather than on a general de novo balancing of interests in each case. 
And the text [sic] gives weight to the constitutional decision made in 
adopting the first amendment by emphasizing that the entire question 
of reconciling social values and objectives is not reopened. This ap-
proach of "defining" rather than "balancing" narrows and structures 
the issue for the courts, bringing it more readily within the bounds 
of judicial procedures. It is true that the process of "defining" re-
quires a weighing of various considerations, but this is not the same as 
open-ended "balancing." 
... [A]s already noted, the process does not result in every com-
munication being given unqualified immunity from restriction or 
regulation under the first amendment. The characterization as "ab-
solute" does serve the purpose, however, of emphasizing the positive 
features of the constitutional guarantee and limiting the area of 
restraint.148 
Viewing the clear and present danger test, therefore, as defining the 
freedoms of speech and the press not only is more consistent with 
the language of the first amendment, but also provides greater as-
surance of protection from governmental suppression than does the 
balancing approach of Justice Frankfurter. 
If the clear and present danger test defines the freedom of ex-
pression protected by the first amendment, and the same freedom is 
protected by the fourteenth, then speech sufficiently dangerous to be 
excluded from the first amendment protection is excluded from 
the protection of the fourteenth amendment as well. This is true 
of any definition of the first amendment freedoms and explains 
why, when the Court in Roth defined those freedoms to exclude 
147. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (dissenting opinion). 
148. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 914-15 (1963). 
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obscenity, it could dispose of Alberts v. California149 in the same 
opinion and on the same grounds. However, the process of "de-
fining" the terms of the first amendment does not exhaust the issues 
under the fourteenth. This definitional process determines the 
boundaries of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment, 
but that amendment still contemplates state infringements of the 
protected liberty so long as they are consistent with due process. 
Careful attention to the language of the Constitution may try 
the patience of some who prefer recourse to dogmatic generalities; 
but if a written constitution is to have genuine meaning, the lan-
guage of the document must be relevant in constitutional adjudica-
tion. We are not bound to the unascertainable "intent of the 
framers" ;150 moreover, "it is a constitution we are expounding,"151 
that is, it is "a constituent act [which has] called into life a being 
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely 
by the most gifted of its begetters."152 But whatever construction we 
might put upon it, we are not free to disregard the language of the 
document.153 Faithfulness to the language dictates neither "conser-
vative" nor "liberal" interpretation,154 but it does provide the only 
basis to legitimate whatever ultimate decision is made. 
Life, property, and corporal liberty are protected by the four-
teenth amendment. That protection does not mean, however, that 
states are precluded from executing felons, fining or imprisoning 
criminals, or appropriating private property for public use; it means 
only that the states cannot take such actions "without due process of 
law." The protected liberty to engage in a lawful business may also 
be regulated or taken away, so long as the requirement of due process 
is satisfied.155 By force of the same constitutional language, the lib-
erty of expression which is protected by the fourteenth amendment 
may also be infringed, so long as the standard of due process is met. 
149. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
150. See Engdahl, Book Review, 21 J. LEGAL ED. ll9 (1968). 
151. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
152. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
153. Neither in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), nor 
in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), was the language of the Constitution 
subverted. On the contrary, the Court resorted to the explicit language of the docu• 
ment-regardless of the original intention of the framers-to legitimate its holdings. 
154. For instance, the celebrated recent decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409 (1968), which applied the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
(1964), to bar all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property, is faithful 
to the language of the thirteenth amendment. 
155. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical 
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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Several of the free speech cases decided since Near v. M innesota166 
have been disposed of on what are essentially procedural due process 
grounds.157 But a number of others have been determined by essen-
tially the same method that the Court employed freely until the New 
Deal era under the aegis of substantive due process. The process of 
weighing competing interests against the constitutional interest in 
safeguarding protected rights, so as to accommodate the necessities 
of security, peace, and order and preservation of other rights without 
defeating the essential purposes of any constitutionally protected 
right, is of the essence of historic substantive due process.168 This is 
the process which has been used by the Court, or several of its mem-
bers, to deal with numerous cases: those concerning the conflict 
between demands for impartial justice and the freedoms of speech 
and press,169 those concerning the effect upon rights of expression of 
laws ensuring public order,160 those concerning the effect of laws 
suppressing suppressible expression as inhibitions upon unsuppres-
sible expression,161 and those concerning laws so broadly written or 
left so much to discretion in their enforcement that they threaten 
greater infringement of protected rights than is necessary to secure 
the competing interest.162 Nevertheless, since the revolt against the 
obstructionist use of substantive due process in the social and eco-
nomic spheres, the Court has invariably failed to recognize that the 
balancing method which it has used in these cases is the method of 
substantive due process.163 Instead, it has treated its inquiry as 
156. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See notes 118-24 supra and accompanying text. 
157. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507 (1948). 
158. See notes 211-12 infra and accompanying text. 
159. E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio 
Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter); Craig v. Harney, 
331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
160. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
U.S. 569 (1941); cf. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See also, e.g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (concerning the inhibitive effect of laws regulating the use 
of amplification devices). 
161. E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 
147 (1959). 
162. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 
303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
163. Occasionally, however, the opinions contain an exceptionally candid indi-
cation that the method used today for first and fourteenth amendment cases 
is essentially the method of substantive due process. Justice Fortas, for example, 
recently stated: "The test that is applicable in every case where conduct is restricted 
or prohibited is whether the regulation is reasonable, due account being taken of 
the paramountcy of First Amendment values." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 
616 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Occasionally, also, the Court frankly applies simi-
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unrelated to the due process clause, and therefore just as appropriate 
to the first amendment as to the fourteenth. Recognition that these 
grounds for decision are in the tradition of substantive due process 
will put an end to the "balancing away" of first amendment 
rights.164 It will ensure that the first amendment will serve its pur-
pose as a guarantee that no federal law will abridge the freedoms of 
speech and the press, subject to definition of those terms; and con-
sideration of substantive due process will be appropriate only as to 
state infringements of the liberty so defined. 
Therefore, the crucial task with respect to state regulation is the 
determination of the standard of substantive due process as it applies 
to the freedom of expression. We may agree with Brandeis and 
Holmes that the standard applied by the majorities in Gitlow and 
Whitney was too lax; indeed, as Brandeis noted, 165 a higher due 
process standard was being applied in the same period to infringe-
ments of economic rights. But the appropriate corrective of the 
vices of Gitlow and Whitney was not the view tendered by Brandeis 
and Holmes.166 
Recently, we have witnessed a clumsy but definite admission of 
due process considerations in a case involving state infringement of 
asserted freedom of expression. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court 
held that a state could define literature as obscene for minors, "at 
least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' 
exposure to such material might be harmful."167 The opinion is 
clumsy because it attempts to be consistent with Roth and regards 
the material rationally found harmful as therefore obscene and con-
sequently, according to Roth, outside the scope of constitutional 
protection. But the test of rationality for the state legislature's find-
ing is distinctly a due process test, reminiscent of the holdings in 
Gitlow and Whitney. 
On the premise that comparison of the language of the first and 
lar substantive standards in conscious due process adjudication, thereby rendering 
false any pretense that substantive due process is an archaic or disreputable con• 
ception. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965), in which the Court observed: 
"The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of the 
governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the 
restriction." 
164. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961) (Justice Black, dis-
senting); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Justice Black, 
dissenting). 
165. See note 138 supra. 
166. For an analysis of the appropriate due process standard for state infringe-
ments of the freedom of expression, see text accompanying notes 186-254 infra. 
167. 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). See notes 68-77 supra and accompanying text. 
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fourteenth amendments precludes treating the standards for state 
and federal regulation of obscenity as identical, we may now proceed 
to inquire what standards might govern each. 
C. The Appropriate Scope of Federal Obscenity Control 
We have already noted the uncertainty in the application of the 
clear and present danger test and discussed the alternative implica-
tions for freedom of expression generally.168 For purposes of federal 
control of obscenity, however, it is not necessary to choose between 
the alternative views. If the clear and present danger test is a qualifi-
cation of the phrase "no law," leading to Justice Frankfurter's ap-
proach of balancing competing interests, an interest of the federal 
government must be found to place on the scale; and if the test is 
viewed as defining the freedoms of speech and of the press, it per-
mits suppression only when the impending evil is, in Justice Holmes' 
words, one "that Congress has a right to prevent."169 It is difficult 
to conceive of any evil which even the most patently offensive, 
prurient, and worthless material might in good faith be said to 
cause-that is an evil which the federal government is constitu-
tionally empowered to prevent. 
In the obscenity cases decided since Roth, no Justice has at-
tempted to explain the constitutional right of Congress to prevent 
whatever evils might be thought to be caused by obscenity; since 
obscenity was held to be per se outside protected expression, it could 
be suppressed. without any such explanation. But if obscenity is now 
to be viewed in the same manner as other speech, it is difficult to 
discern a federal interest that could justify suppression by the na-
tional government. Even Justice Harlan, who from the first has 
rejected the Roth test and urged a minimum role for federal cen-
sorship, has never explained what constitutional basis exists for 
federal suppression even of hard-core pornography.17° 
It is by now a familiar and orthodox doctrine that Congress 
may use its enumerated powers as means to accomplish extraneous 
ends,171 just as it may use extraneous measures as means to accom-
168. See text accompanying notes 137-48 supra. 
169. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
170. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra. 
171. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Champion v. Ames, 
188 U.S. 321 (1903). In fact, Congress may have extraneous unespoused objectives in 
mind when it enacts legislation "necessary and proper" to the accomplishment of 
some espoused constitutional end. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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plish ends specifically entrusted to it by the Constitution.172 Congress 
may, for example, use its postal or commerce power to support 
regulations designed to protect morals.173 But when such regulations 
abridge the freedom of expression, they threaten collision with the 
first amendment; and such a collision can be avoided only if the 
expression presents a sufficient risk of a consequence that Congress 
has a right to prevent. Now, can we say that, because Congress may 
use its postal or commerce power as a means to regulate morals, it 
has a general right to regulate morals? Congress may outlaw the in-
terstate transportation of women for immoral purposes,174 thus 
exercising its commerce power to control prostitution; has Congress, 
then, a general power to control prostitution, so that federal law 
could punish a strictly local prostitute admitted to have no connec-
tion with or effect upon interstate commerce? Congress may use 
enumerated power A to advance extraneous objective B; does 
this mean, not merely that Congress has power to advance B by 
means of A, but rather that Congress has the general power to 
advance B, so that the necessary and proper clause empowers Con-
gress to employ other extraneous means to accomplish more effec-
tively the extraneous objective B? Such a "bootstrap" view of 
federal power has never been sustained, except by implication in one 
case,175 and in that case, it was sustained through failure in analysis 
of the precedents rather than by deliberate decision. 176 Such a view 
172. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819). Moreover, it is for Congress to choose the means, provided only that it have 
a rational basis for its choice. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
173. E.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
174. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). See also Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
175. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745, 774·86 (1966) (separate opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Douglas). If § 5 of the fourteenth amendment were viewed as 
empowering Congress to provide against only state action, the objective, however, 
being to secure the enjoyment of equal rights, then federal legislation against private 
interference with such enjoyment could not be sustained except by the "bootstrap" 
reasoning. Brennan, to avoid that impasse, reasoned that the fourteenth amendment 
"secured" the rights generally, although it specifically proscribed only state inter• 
ference with them. Under this reasoning, federal legislation outlawing private inter-
ference with the enjoyment of the secured rights was not a means of better accom-
plishing the e.xtraneous end which the amendment itself was only a partial means 
of accomplishing, but rather was a means of accomplishing the end specifically 
"secured" by the amendment's first section itself. 
176. In Sullivan, the Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
[21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1946)] could be constitutionally applied to an act of misbrand-
ing drugs which had once crossed state lines even though a subsequent intrastate 
transaction had intervened, and even though there was no suggestion that the local 
misconduct had any effect upon interstate commerce. 332 U.S. at 697-98. For au-
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would, of course, render the federal government virtually omni-
competent, obliterating all the extant boundaries between state and 
federal power. 
The same illogic necessary to sustain such bootstrap omnicom-
petence would be necessary to sustain federal obscenity legislation 
under even the broadest interpretation of the clear and present 
danger test. Like the language of the necessary and proper clause, 
the evil "that Congress has a right to prevent"177 must contemplate, 
not extraneous objectives at which Congress may aim the exercise of 
its constitutional powers, but objectives constitutionally entrusted 
to the care of the federal government. It follows that, even if it were 
proved that the publication or distribution of obscenity would im-
mediately and incontestably result in illicit behavior or would re-
duce every citizen to a dissolute, lecherous, Oedipal ·wretch, federal 
obscenity controls could not be sustained; for these are not evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent. 
There is, however, a limited role for federal law regarding ob-
scenity, which may be constitutionally supported. Congress should 
have power to prohibit mailing or interstate shipment of materials 
to any person who objects to such materials.178 This power, which 
thority the Court cited McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), a case that is 
clearly distinguishable. In McDermott, the federal law prohibited the interstate ship-
ment of syrup not bearing certain labelling, and contained a provision permitting 
the government to enforce that regulation by inspection of the product after delivery. 
The Court held that the enforcement provision was constitutional under the neces-
sary and proper clause, and that a state law interfering with that means of enforce-
ment had been pre-empted. The inspection provision was a means to the end of 
regulating commerce, and the fact that the commercial regulation was itself a means 
to the extraneous end of consumer protection was irrelevant. In Sullivan, however, 
the Court's holding was completely different. There an act of misbranding after ship-
ment in interstate commerce was held to be reachable by the federal act, not because 
the reach of the act was necessary and proper to prevent the misbranding of goods 
in interstate commerce, but because it was necessary in order to. accomplish the ex-
traneous objective at which the regulation of interstate commerce was aimed-namely, 
consumer protection. 
Congress quickly took advantage of Sullivan's unprecedented holding, and amended 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in order to make unambiguous its intention to 
reach as far as the Court had held that it could. Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 582. 
See Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food 
and Drug Laws, 14 J. PUB. L. 276, 292 n.90 (1965). 
The reach of the federal law sustained in Sullivan could arguably have been sus-
tained on the ground that intrastate transactions in drugs have an effect on interstate 
commerce. But that was not the ground articulated in Sullivan; in its endorsement 
of the "bootstrap" theory of federal power, Sullivan is clearly anomalous. 
177. See text accompanying note 129 supra. 
178. A federal statute authorizes the Postmaster General, upon request by an 
addressee who has received advertisements offering for sale materials that the ad-
dressee "in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provoca-
tive," to issue an order forbidding further mailings of such advertisements to that 
addressee. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). A recent case upheld the consti-
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should not be limited to obscene materials but should apply equally 
to all materials,179 might be justified on either of two grounds. The 
better ground, in this ·writer's judgment, is the argument that the 
freedoms of speech and press, by definition, do not encompass any 
right to impose expression upon an unwilling audience.180 Thus, 
federal regulations which do not categorically exclude obscene ma-
terials from interstate commerce or the mails, but prohibit only their 
mailing or shipment to unwilling recipients, would in no way in-
fringe the freedoms of speech and press. 
There is, however, another arguable ground for the same con-
clusion. There is clearly emerging a broad constitutional right of 
privacy, of particular vigor when it protects a person in his own 
home.181 Since this right is included in fourteenth amendment "lib-
erty," the fifth section of that amendment empowers Congress to 
buttress the right "by appropriate legislation." If the authority of 
Congress under this enforcement section is read-as several members 
of the Court in 1966 seemed prepared to read it182-broadly enough 
to empower Congress to reach private as well as state action inter-
fering with fourteenth amendment liberty, Congress could act to 
protect rights of privacy by outlawing unsolicited mailings or other 
presentations of obscenity to a person in his home or other private 
place. Such legislation would stand, not as a regulation of the mails 
or of commerce, but as a means to achieve an end that Congress is 
constitutionally empowered to achieve: the protection of privacy. 
tutionality of that statute. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. 
Cal. 1969). The Court in that case held that § 4009 violated neither the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause nor the first amendment's guarantees of free speech and 
free press. It also found that the section was not void for vagueness, and that it did 
not constitute an unlawful delegation of power. The case has been appealed to the Su-
preme Court, and is docketed for argument during the present term. 38 U.S.L.W. 
3097 CTuly 28, 1969) (No. 399). 
Another limited role for federal law-but one containing great potential for abuse 
-is in the regulation of the broadcasting industry. Not only is the viewer or listener 
in a position that makes him vulnerable to unsolicited offense, but the broadcasting 
industry enjoys a governmentally conferred status comparable to monopoly, and thus 
broadcasting is unlike ordinary speech. As the Court recently stated: " •.. differences 
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment stan-
dards applied to them." R:ed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
179. The rationale which would legitimate the exercise of such power should 
apply regardless of the type of materials to which the recipient objects. Thus third 
class bulk mail-commonly referred to as "junk mail"-should be subject to the 
same congressional restraint as obscene materials. 
180. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949). 
181. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
182. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 CTustice Clark, joined by Justices Black 
and Fortas, concurring), 777-80 CTustice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Douglas, concurring) (1966). 
December 1969] Requiem for Roth 221 
The latter argument, however, depends entirely upon acceptance 
of the proposition that congressional power under section 5 of 
the fourteenth amendment extends to the proscription of nonstate 
invasions of liberty. Desirable as such a power might be, it is not clear 
that the amendment confers it. Three of those Justices who in 1966 
opined that it does-Justices Brennan and Douglas and Chief Justice 
·warren-did so by an argument to the logic of which this writer 
must demur;183 and only two of them now remain on the Court. 
Three other Justices-Clark, Black, and Fortas-offered no sup-
porting argument, but merely proclaimed their conclusion;184 and 
only one of them now remains on the Court. The opinion of the 
Court specifically reserved the question for future disposition.185 
Consequently, this writer prefers to rest the power to prevent the 
unsolicited mailing or interstate shipment of materials to any person 
to whom they are objectionable upon definition of the freedoms of 
speech and the press, rather than upon section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
D. The Appropriate Scope of State Obscenity Control 
Since the liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment, so far 
as it relates to speech and the press, is to be defined by reference to 
the first amendment,186 the clear and present danger test which ap-
plies in the case of federal suppression is applicable also in the case 
of state suppression. However, while that test in this writer's judg-
ment leaves no room for general federal obscenity laws,187 the same 
test does leave open the possibility of state controls. Although the 
possible effects of obscenity are consequences Congress has no con-
stitutional right to prevent, the tradition of state police powers is 
broad enough that the states do have the right to prevent at least 
certain of the consequences which obscene materials might be shown 
to cause. Thus, for example, if the states are admitted to have power 
to prevent acts of criminal sexuality, and if certain materials can be 
183. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 777-80 (1966); note 175 supra. 
184. "[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers 
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-
that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 383 U.S. at 762 Oustice Clark, 
joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurring). 
185. 383 U.S. at 755 (1966). However, Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's 
opinion in Guest, observed in a later concurring opinion that only Justice Harlan 
dissented from Guest's "square holding" that the right to travel involved in Guest 
was assertable against private action. Shapiro v. New York, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43 & n.3 
(1969) Oustice Stewart, concurring). 
186. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
187. See text accompanying notes 171-76 supra. 
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shown to create a clear and present danger of such acts being per-
petrated, state suppression of those materials would be constitu-
tional. 
Application of the clear and present danger test, however, only 
partially completes the task of delineating the power of the states 
over expression. As pointed out above,188 the language of the four-
teenth amendment contemplates some scope for state regulation even 
of expression which is protected. Indeed, the limits on infringements 
of protected expression are more important to obscenity control 
than is the definition of what is and is not protected, for until the 
scientific evidence becomes considerably more conclusive,189 proof 
of a clear and present danger inherent in obscenity would seem to 
be foreclosed. 
The standard which the due process clause imposes for state ac-
tion outside the judicial arena has been the subject of litigation 
since the first decade after passage of the fourteenth amendment.100 
Most of the cases have involved state regulations of business and 
economic affairs. As is well known, the due process standard which 
today is enforced against state economic regulations is rooted in the 
holding of Nebbia v. New York that "the guarantee of due pro-
cess ... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, ar-
bitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real 
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."191 In 
accord with the approach of Nebbia, it has been held that "regula-
tion which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in 
the interests of the community is due process."192 It is clear that the 
particular regulation chosen by the legislature need not be the best 
possible means of dealing with a particular problem: "[i]t is enough 
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be 
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way 
to correct it."193 Not only has the due process test for state economic 
regulations become one of the mere rationality of the legislation's 
188. See text accompanying notes 150-55 supra. 
189. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968). The Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography, created by Act of Oct. 3, 1967, 81 Stat. 253, and scheduled 
to repon to the President and Congress by July 30, 1970, was charged, among other 
duties, with studying the effects of obscenity and its relationship to antisocial be-
havior. 
190. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
191. 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
192. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
193. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). See also Note, Michi-
gan Statute Requiring Motorcyclists To Wear Protective Helmets Held Unconstitu-
tional, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 360 (1968). 
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relationship to a legitimate end; the Court has gone so far in defer-
ring to the legislature's finding of a rational relationship that in one 
recent case Justice Harlan was obliged to concur separately "on the 
ground that this state measure [apparently on Harlan's independent 
determination] bears a rational relation to a constitutionally per-
missible objective."194 The due process standard thus enforced 
against state economic regulations is comparable to the standard 
which the Court enforces in the case of congressional legislation 
under the necessary and proper clause, especially with respect to 
interstate commerce. In such cases, the Court has left the question 
whether a particular activity affects commerce, so as to be regulable 
under the necessary and proper clause, to decision by Congress,. re-
serving to itself the power of further examination only to determine 
whether or not there is a rational basis for the congressional find-
ing.lllts 
However, the restraints placed upon the states by the fourteenth 
amendment may change with variations in subject matter. This fact 
is well established with respect to the equal protection clause. The 
Court has deemed that economic regulation is permissible under 
that clause if a legislative classification "has relation to the purpose 
for which it is made .... "196 The Court stated in 1961: "[a] statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it .... "197 In only one modern case of eco-
nomic regulation has the Supreme Court found a statutory classifica-
tion so remote from the purpose of the act as to offend the equal 
protection clause.198 Racial classifications, however, fare differently 
under that clause. A statutory discrimination based on race "will be 
upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to 
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."199 The special 
treatment accorded racial classifications under the equal protection 
clause is justified by the fact that equality of treatment of the races 
was the overriding objective of the fourteenth amendment. But with 
regard to classifications affecting highly valued rights other than 
racial equality, the Supreme Court has been considerably more 
ready to find violations of the equal protection clause than it has 
194. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (concurring opinion), citing 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
195. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
196. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
197. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
198. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
199. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 11 (1967). 
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with regard to economic regulations. 200 Whether or not the freedom 
of speech is regarded as occupying a "preferred position" in our 
jurisprudence, it is certainly true that our system and traditions 
place an extremely high value upon this freedom; and it would seem 
that, when the fourteenth amendment is applied to matters beyond 
the racial problems with which it immediately dealt, the due process 
clause, like the equal protection clause, must take account of the 
different values to be placed upon the several liberties which might 
be at stake. 
The original doctrine of substantive due process is receptive to 
distinctions in the degree of protection afforded to liberties of dif-
ferent values. While it was foreshadowed in earlier cases decided 
under the fifth amendment,201 the doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess did not flower until after enactment of the fourteenth amend-
ment. At first, in Munn v. Illinois,202 a case of economic regulation, 
infringements of property rights were justified under the due process 
clause by a holding that "[w]hen ... one devotes his property to a 
use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the 
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by 
the public for the common good .... "203 The Court then held that 
regulation of charges for the use of such property was not a viola-
tion of the due process clause so long as the legislature considered 
that regulation reasonable. 
But a different standard was soon proclaimed for more highly 
valued rights. In Hurtado v. California,204 decided in 1884, the 
Court distinguished the American due process clause from compa-
rable guarantees which had long been established in England: 
The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as 
guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his preroga-
tive. It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security 
against their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the 
power of Parliament; so that bills of attainder ... and other arbitrary 
acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history, were 
never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land . . .. The 
200. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 458 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 655 CTustice 
Harlan, dissenting). 
201. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). 
202. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
203. 94 U.S. at 126. 
204. ll0 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative 
tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the 
Commons. 
In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to 
protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroach-
ments of power delegated to their governments . . . . They were 
limitations upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as 
executive and judicial. 
... Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpa-
tion and tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also against 
arbitrary legislation; but, in that application ... they must be held 
to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very sub-
stance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property . 
. . . [I]t is not to be supposed that these legislative powers are 
absolute and despotic, and that the amendment prescribing due 
process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical 
restraint .... The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process 
is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of 
individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers, 
as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of 
lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the 
force of the government.205 
'While this general language, indicating that the Court must deter-
mine arbitrariness or reasonableness, makes no distinction among 
the several rights and liberties thus protected, the case involved the 
process by which a man could be deprived of his life, a most highly 
valued right; and the lvfunn case, which had been decided only 
seven years before and which had allowed the legislature to decide 
the reasonableness of economic regulations, was not specifically im-
pugned. 
Very soon thereafter, however, the Court began to usurp the 
legislative function it had declined in Munn with respect to eco-
nomic regulations. From 1890 onward,206 the Court invalidated 
scores of measures of social and economic regulation on grounds that 
they infringed property rights and economic liberties in a manner 
the Court thought unreasonable, and hence violative of substantive 
due process. Curiously, during this same period, while the economic 
cases were decided inconsistently with Munn and the Court took 
to itself the question of the reasonableness of economic regulations, 
the Court reneged on Hurtado in cases involving personal rights. 
Thus, in Gitlow and Whitney the Court virtually abdicated its role 
as assessor of the reasonableness of infringements of rights of expres-
205. llO U.S. at 531-32, 535-36. 
206. Minnesota Rate Case, 1!14 U.S. 418 (1890). 
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sion and deferred to the judgment of the legislators on that mat-
ter.207 The reason for this curious inversion of the original doctrine 
is not obscure: the majority of Justices during that era placed a high 
value on economic rights, and felt more concern over their infringe-
ment than over the suppression of dissidents' speech. 
Since 1934,208 substantive due process with regard to economic 
rights has returned to the original doctrine propounded in Munn, 
leaving the reasonableness of economic regulations to be determined 
by the legislature.209 In overreaction against the obstructionist abuses 
of economic substantive due process, however, the baby has been 
thrown out with the bath. Rather than recognize the receptivity of 
the historic conception of substantive due process to differences in 
the value of the rights it protects, the Court has declined to confess 
that it continues to deal with infringements of rights of expression 
in traditional substantive due process terms. Thus, while declining 
to identify its deliberations as assessments of substantive due process, 
it has applied them indiscriminately to federal as well as state cases-
under the first as well as the fourteenth amendment. Thus, not only 
is it feasible to deal with state control of expression in historic sub-
stantive due process terms, without the compulsion to apply the 
"minimum rationality" test of the economic cases; but the Court 
has consistently been employing just such an analysis,210 although 
without admitting the characterization and therefore without con-
fining its essentially due process judgments to cases of state regula-
tion. 
Historic substantive due process doctrine requires a sufficient re-
lationship between a regulation and a legitimate state objective; in 
the absence of that relationship the regulation is arbitrary and thus 
impermissible.211 The doctrine also entrusts to the Court the protec-
tion of "the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and 
property,"212 to prevent violations of "the essential attributes of that 
liberty,"213 while at the same time recognizing that these liberties are 
not absolute and must be subject to some regulation to accommodate 
competing legitimate state interests.214 Thus, application of a sub-
201. See text accompanying notes 108-13 supra. 
208. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
209. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
210. See notes 159-62 supra. 
211. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 502-25 (1934). 
212. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884). 
213. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). 
214. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113 (1877). 
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stantive due process test unavoidably involves the exercise of judg-
ment. There is no solace here for those who insist that the guarantees 
against state infringements of liberty are "absolutes." But, as com-
mentators have demonstrated, even the absolutists indulge in balanc-
ing when they determine what is the right that is "absolutely" pro-
tected and what does and does not constitute an infringement.215 As 
one commentator has stated: "[a]ll judges balance competing in-
terests in deciding constitutional questions-even those who most 
vigorously deny their willingness to do so."216 Resort to absolutes 
gives a sense of immutability and transcendency to constitutional 
adjudication, but it is a false sense.217 The function of law is not to 
eliminate judgment, but, by structuring the questions for decision, 
to confine it within narrow bounds. Thus, one apologist for the 
absolutist approach to first amendment liberties has answered its 
critics by pointing out that "[t]his approach of 'defining' rather than 
'balancing' narrows and structures the issue for the Court, bringing 
it more readily within the bounds of judicial procedures."218 We 
have endorsed that approach to the first amendment, but found that 
it cannot apply equally to the fourteenth amendment because of 
the latter's due process clause.219 However, we can accomplish the 
same objective of narrowing and structuring the issue for the Court 
215. See, e.g., P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION ll4-17 (1962). 
216. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75, 
79-80 (1960). 
217. "[T]o remove candor from one's description of the decisional process is to 
strike at the heart of the rule of law. • • • [A]bsolutists risk the independence of 
the judiciary by den}ing their basic judicial responsibility, which is to exercise judg-
ment." Karst, supra note 216, at 80. 
218. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 914-15 (1963) (quoted in context in text accompanying note 137 supra). 
219. Justice Douglas himself, joined by Justice Black, has indicated the possible 
consequences for state obscenity legislation if the fourteenth amendment restrictions 
on the state are viewed as distinct from the restrictions which the first amendment 
places on Congress. Dissenting in Ginsberg, Douglas wrote, "If we were in the field 
of substantive due process and seeking to measure the propriety of state law by the 
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, I suppose there would be no difficulty un-
der our decisions in sustaining this act." 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968). Indeed, Douglas sees 
no reason, if what he calls "substantive due process" is to be the test, why legislatures 
should be limited to protecting only children: "If rationality is the measure of the 
validity of this law, then I can see how modem Anthony Coinstocks could make out a 
case for 'protecting' many groups in our society, not merely children." 390 U.S. at 655. 
Concurring in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 703-04 (1968), 
Douglas, again joined by Justice Black, stated: "If we assume arguendo that the censor-
ship of obscene publications, whether for children or for adults, is in the area of sub-
stantive due process, the States have a very wide range indeed for determining what 
kind of movie, novel, poem, or article is harmful.'' But Douglas and Black have too 
narrow a view of the scope of substantive due process. Under a substantive due pro-
cess standard, there is still a great deal of restraint on state obscenity control. See 
text accompanying notes 220-54 infra. 
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by a careful assemblage of the considerations appropriate under the 
due process clause. The exercise of judgment upon each of the factors 
in the context of particular cases and issues is a task for judges, not 
professors; but to aid in defining the factors to narrow and structure 
the questions for judgment is a task not only for judges, but for 
professors and all students of our constitutional system. 
It bears repeating that the question before us concerns the re-
quirements of fourteenth amendment substantive due process-a 
separate question from that addressed by the clear and present 
danger test. That test defines the liberty protected; we are here con-
cerned with the standards for state infringement of liberty admitted 
to be protected. However, some of the factors involved in the clear 
and present danger test are factors which also are relevant here. 
Recognition of differences in the values we attach to property rights 
and various liberties requires that we recognize the elements of the 
due process test as variables, so that the test operates as a framework 
for structuring judgment and not as a wooden "hornbook" rule. It 
seems to this writer that four factors must be considered in judging 
the validity of state infringements of liberty under a substantive due 
process test: the legitimacy of the state's interest, or the constitu-
tional permissibility of the end to which the regulation is claimed to 
be related; the substantiality of the legitimate state interest; the 
means-to-end relationship between a particular piece of legislation 
and the legitimate state interest; and the effect of countervailing 
interests. These factors will now be examined more closely insofar as 
they bear directly on the state's control of obscenity. 
l. The Legitimacy of the State Interest 
Before reaching the question whether particular legislation is 
sufficiently related to an objective, it must be determined whether 
the objective itself is within the constitutional power of a state. Cer-
tainly a state has power to prevent acts of violence, including sexual 
violence and sexual assaults upon unwilling persons, young or old. 
Perhaps the states must also be admitted the power to insure the 
mental health and proper social adjustment of their youth, even 
though these spongy concepts are highly relative. But the enforce-
ment of traditional or contemporary moral standards of sexual be-
havior among consenting adults is a matter which has already been 
put in some question220 and on which continuing developments can 
220. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, :!60 U.S. 684 
(1959). 
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be anticipated. Moreover, the legitimacy of a state's interest in what 
transpires in the privacy of one's own home has been put in serious 
question.221 Thus, statutes designed to protect the citizenry from 
violence that could result from the spread of obscenity and those 
designed to protect the youth of a state from the corruption of ob-
scenity have as their goal a legitimate state interest; and unless those 
statutes are impermissible under one of the other three £actors, they 
may constitutionally interfere with free expression. But the state may 
not enact legislation which has as an objective the protection of 
adults from themselves. 
The above limitations on the power of states to regulate are 
easily applied to the regulation of speech and of published materials. 
But when nonverbal expression, such as various forms of action and 
of dramatic communication, is at issue, the legitimacy of the state 
interest in regulation is much more difficult to appraise. Earlier in 
our history, it was held that the requirement of due process imposed 
no restraints on indirect or consequential infringements of property 
or liberty.222 Today, however, expression by means of nonverbal 
action deserves and receives constitutional protection, but not every 
action is protected merely because it is labelled expressive. The 
Court has held that regulation of action, however expressive, 
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.223 
For purposes of federal regulation that test may be formulated in 
terms of a definition of the freedoms protected by the first amend-
ment, but the same considerations would be pertinent in judging 
state regulations by the standard of due process. Indeed, although 
the language quoted above is taken from a case involving a federal 
regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards, the Court in 
another recent case applied a similar test to a local regulation.224 
221. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
222. "[fhe fifth amendment due process] provision has always been understood as 
referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting 
from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing 
upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals." Legal 
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871). 
223. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
224. Tinker v. Des l\foines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
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That case was concerned with a school regulation prohibiting a form 
of expression which presented the possibility of disruption of school 
decorum, but which, unlike the draft card destruction, did not in-
terfere with any other state interest. In applying an interest balanc-
ing test, the Court held that the state's interest in school decorum 
was insufficient to justify the regulation.225 Thus, the legitimacy of 
the state's interest in preventing the forbidden action may be ad-
mitted, but the substantiality of that interest must be determined 
and weighed against its effect on the freedom of expression. 
The same approach seems appropriate for dealing with live 
dramatic expression. Some modern theatrical productions involve 
kinds of behavior which states have traditionally had the power to 
punish; but the legitimate state interest in regulating behavior 
should not be sufficient in itself to justify prosecution of performers 
in such productions. Rather, the substantiality of the state's interest 
must be weighed along with the other factors involved in questions 
of freedom of expression. 
It has already been noted that the right of privacy is gaining in-
creasing constitutional stature.226 State legislation whose purpose is 
the protection rather than invasion of one's privacy would seem 
to have a legitimate objective. Protection of citizens from being 
subjected unwillingly or unwittingly to offensive expression seems 
to be a legitimate state interest. Pursuant to this interest, a state 
might, for example, prohibit distribution of unsolicited obscenity 
by mail227 or any other means.228 
Such legislation, however, is to be distinguished from that which 
would suppress expression that some persons might consider of-
fensive. Nevertheless, there has been some case support for the 
proposition that expression can be restrained solely because it is 
offensive. In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,229 the Court construed 
the Federal Comstock Act230 as requiring for conviction thereunder 
225. 393 U.S. at 507-14. 
226. See note 181 supra. 
227. Even though the postal system is a federal instrumentality, such legislation 
by the states should be valid unless deliberately pre-empted. For a discussion of the 
doctrine of pre-emption, see Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: 11. Remedy for Pre-
emption of State Food and Drug Laws, 14 J. PUB. L. 276, 279-305 (1965). If there 
were fears of unintended pre-emption, however, federal legislation could assuage the 
fear by specifically authorizing state legislation. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 
328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
228. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
229. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). 
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The Act prohibits the mailing of obscene matter and 
establishes criminal penalties for violation of its provisions. 
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not only that the materials appeal to prurient interests, but also that 
they be "deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current com-
munity standards of decency."231 The statute, the Court held, "has 
always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of 
sex.''232 Manual Enterprises has been interpreted by adherents of the 
Roth rationale as establishing "patent offensiveness" not only as an 
additional statutory requirement under the Comstock Act, but as 
an additional constitutional requirement for a finding of obscenity. 
Thus, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, the second coalescing element 
which Justice Brennan included in the definition of obscenity was 
that "the material is patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the description or repre-
sentation of sexual matters.''233 In no other area of speech is the 
mere offensiveness of an expression any justification for its suppres-
sion. Certainly, persons should be protected from the plight of hav-
ing offensive utterances thrust upon them when they have no 
opportunity for escape;234 and there should be a limited restraint oi;i 
speech which is so offensive as to provoke breaches of the peace.235 
But expression may not be restrained solely on the ground that some 
people regard it as unpatriotic or sacrilegious and thus as extremely 
offensive.236 Similarly, if obscenity is not to be treated as a distinct 
class of speech categorically excluded from constitutional protec-
tion, it seems difficult to justify its suppression merely because it 
is very offensive to some, to many, or even to almost all "decent" 
people.237 Of course, the patent offensiveness test under Roth and 
231. 370 U.S. at 484. 
232. 370 U.S. at 483. 
233. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
234. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 
!143 U.S. 451 (1952). 
235. Feiner v. New York, !140 U.S. 315 (1951). Some cases have treated such speech 
as outside the category of protected expression. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). 
236. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
l!4ll U.S. 495 (1952). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940). 
2ll7. The offensiveness of obscenity, however, has been frequently decried. For 
example, Mr. Richard H. Kuh of New York City, addressing the Third Circuit Judi-
cial Conference in September 1966 quoted D.H. Lawrence's reference to pornography 
as "the attempt to insult sex" and make it "[u]gly and cheap • • • degraded . • • 
trivial and cheap and nasty." He then opined: "I think the ban on pandering which 
markets an item, not for its beauty, not for its historical value, not for its classical 
interest, but just for its cheapness and nastiness, is something that our society can 
properly support." 42 F.R.D. 504, 513 (1968). A majority of the Supreme Court today 
would probably approve prosecutions for such pandering even without the Roth test, 
as Chief Justice Warren did in his concurring opinion in Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 
(1957). But to suppress the material itself, as distinguished from the act of pandering 
that material, because it degrades and insults sex-as Kuh has urged at length in his 
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its progeny is a criterion for excluding certain expression from con-
stitutional protection; but with the demise of Roth it seems impos-
sible to justify recognition of a legitimate state interest in protecting 
the citizens' sensibilities with regard to sexual expression, just as 
such an interest cannot be justified when religious or political ex-
pression is at issue. 238 
2. The Substantiality of the Legitimate State Interest 
Early in the development of the clear and present danger test, 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis qualified the original formulation 
from Schenck v. United States239 by urging that to justify suppres-
sion of speech, the evil consequence feared to ensue from that speech 
should be serious or substantial.240 The substantiality of the legiti-
mate interest sought to be protected should also be a factor in de-
termining the constitutionality, under the due process clause, of 
state suppression of obscenity. The state may have a more substantial 
interest in protecting children from the possible consequences of 
obscenity than it has in so protecting adults. Similarly, the state 
may have a more substantial interest in preventing sexual "perver-
book Foolish Fig-Leaves? Pornography in-and Out of-Court (1967)-would be as un-
constitutional as to suppress sacrilege or verbal aspersions of the flag. 
238. Another aspect of Roth is equally unsound. In the course of his argument in 
the Court's opinion in Roth, Justice Brennan stated: 
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people ...• All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance 
-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing cli-
mate of opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees. 
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). It was in this context that Brennan found that "implicit in 
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without 
redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. at 484. Thus, Roth may be read to mean that 
obscenity is unprotected since it is not a part of any dialogue concerning political and 
social questions. In the first place, that conclusion is simply untrue. Obscenity may at 
times fulfill the same role with respect to unorthodox conceptions of social relations 
and morality that satire fulfills with respect to other kinds of social criticism. In fact, 
it may even heighten the impact of social criticism through the eloquence of shock. 
But aside from this fact, to confine liberty of expression in the way that Brennan's 
proposition does, would exclude from protection a large variety of innocuous, but 
pointless, communication. A great deal of expression has as its purpose mere enter-
tainment, and the suppression of such expression would not be tolerated despite any 
attempts to justify the suppression on the ground that only the "interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes" is protected. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that various publications which contained "nothing of any 
possible value to society" were nonetheless protected: "The line between the in-
forming and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right." 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Expression concerning sex should be 
afforded the same degree of freedom under the first and fourteenth amendments as 
is expression concerning any other subject, because "the rights of free speech and a 
free press are not confined to any field of human interest." Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 531 (1945). 
239. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
240. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 377 (1927). 
December 1969] Requiem for Roth 233 
sion" than it has in denying entertainment to those deemed to be 
already "perverted." Substantially, however, cannot be considered in 
isolation. It varies in relation to the weight accorded countervailing 
interests,241 and in turn affects the degree of relationship which 
should be required between the liberty-infringing means and the 
legitimate end sought to be attained. 
3. The Means-to-End Relationship Between a Particular Piece of 
Legislation and the Legitimate State Interest 
In Dennis v. United States,242 Chief Justice Vinson and the three 
Justices who joined in his opinion243 endorsed Judge Learned Hand's 
reformulation of the clear and present danger test under the first 
amendment: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of 
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion 
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."244 Opinions may 
differ on the question whether that reformulation is too great a com-
promise of the protection which the first amendment affords against 
federal suppression. But as an element of the due process test that 
governs state suppression of obscenity, such a formula makes possible 
an accommodation benveen those who fear the dire consequences of 
obscenity and those who note the inconclusiveness of the scientific 
evidence as to its harmfulness. Judge Hand's statement suggests that 
if the evil feared is very great, a lesser showing of its probability 
should be sufficient for suppression than if the evil feared is small. 
Applied in the case of obscenity, this approach would mean that a 
relatively insubstantial state interest could justify suppression only 
if the damage to that interest is highly probable to follow from the 
publication or circulation of obscenity. On the other hand, if the 
potential evil were much greater-that is, if the state's interest 
in preventing the evil were very substantial-the obscenity would be 
suppressible on a lesser showing of probability that it would cause 
the evil. In the field of economic regulation, the very substantial 
state interest in controlling economic forces justifies infringements 
of property rights and freedom of contract on a showing of minimum 
rationality in the relationship of regulatory means to the end. While 
there is no necessity to apply that same lax standard to other areas, 
as the Court did in Ginsberg v. New York,245 the greater sub-
241. See text accompanying notes 247-54 infra. 
242. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
243. These were Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton. 
244. 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting from the opinion below, 183 F.2d 201, 212 
(2d Cir. 1950). 
245. 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968); see text accompanying notes 65-77 supra. 
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stantiality of the state interest at stake in protecting its children 
would justify upholding the suppression of the distribution of ob-
scene materials to minors on a lesser showing of the probability of 
a cause and effect relationship than should be required in the case of 
distribution to adults. 
The over-sufficiency of the means for the accomplishment of the 
end must also be considered with respect to the relationship of sup-
pressive legislation to the asserted state interest. Even the most 
substantial state interest should not justify legislation which aids in 
the protection of that interest, but does far more than is necessary to 
protect it. The overbroad statute, in obscenity cases as elsewhere, is 
violative of the due process clause.246 
4. The Effect of Countervailing Interests 
The clearest and most immediate relationship between an ut-
terance and an evil that a state has a substantial and legitimate in-
terest in preventing would not justify punishment of the speaker 
without a fair trial. Similarly, other countervailing interests might 
outweigh an interest which would be served by suppression.247 
Stanley v. Georgia, for example, recognized that the right of a person 
to read or observe what he pleases in the privacy of his own home is 
an interest in competition with a state's interest in the control of 
obscenity.248 The right of parents to control the upbringing of their 
children is also a substantial interest, which may compete with state 
interests that might be served by obscenity control. However, the 
interest in parental authority might not be given such weight as to 
prevent prosecution of a parent who deliberately "depraves" his 
child with pornography, assuming a substantial state interest in 
preventing such "depravity," any more than it prevents prosecution 
of a parent who seduces or otherwise physically abuses his child.249 
The greatest interest to be weighed against any state interest 
claimed to justify state suppression of expression, however, is the 
interest of a free people in the freedom of speech itself. This is the 
246. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, !!IO U.S. 88 
(1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The problem of vagueness pre-
sents a different issue. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). A law may 
establish a sufficiently ascertained standard of guilt, and thus avoid the procedural 
due process vice of vagueness, and yet be so broad in its reach that it inhibits actions 
which, on consideration appropriate under substantive due process, may not be so 
inhibited. 
247. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
248. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See text accompanying notes 79-92 supra. However, the 
Court in Stanley did not regard that privacy interest as absolutely controlling or as 
controlling in all circumstances. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra. 
249. Cf. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947). 
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point that was emphasized by the Court in Hurtado and Near: the 
Court must protect "the very substance"250 of this liberty and must 
repel any invasion of its "essential attributes."251 We are thus 
referred to the history and purpose of the constitutional guaranty, 
most eloquently stated by Justice Brandeis252 and in our own day by 
Justice Douglas.253 Furthermore, even measures which otherwise 
would be permissible will violate substantive due process if, while 
suppressing the constitutionally suppressible, they also intimidate 
unsuppressible expression.254 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Since the cases seem to indicate that the regime of Roth has 
ended, it is important to determine what approach will arise to re-
place it. This Article has, through an analysis of existing constitu-
tional law, suggested a possible approach. According to that ap-
proach, obscene expression should be treated no differently from 
nonobscene expression, and the only important matter for examina-
tion is the application of familiar constitutional standards to the 
particular dangers posed by obscenity. 
Since the legitimate federal interest in regulating obscenity is 
extremely limited, the primary concern of this Article has been an 
examination of the bases of permissible state regulation. The pro-
posed framework for decision on state legislation is not a new struc-
ture, but is the familiar substantive due process standard, detailed 
with new precision. That framework will not by itself decide any 
state obscenity case. It is only a skeleton to which flesh must be added 
gradually by judicial decision. The legitimacy of certain state in-
terests, their substantiality, the means-to-end relationship between 
particular legislation and legitimate interests, and the effects of 
countervailing interests must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Each of these determinations will call for the exercise of judgment, 
with its inevitable subjective component; none involves absolutes. 
Moreover, it may be admitted that the factors treated here as distinct 
coalesce in reality. But this suggested framework for deliberation, 
while keeping faith with the language of the Constitution, does 
serve the purpose of narrowing and structuring the issues for de-
cision by the Court. 
250. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884). 
251. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). 
252. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
253. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra. 
254. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147 (1959). See also note 158 supra. 
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I£ decisions are made within that framework, any degree of 
strictures upon state control of obscenity could ultimately be im-
posed, and different degrees of restraint could be imposed for vari-
ous situations. Thus, some types of legislation might be permissible 
if they can be shown to have any rational connection to a legitimate 
state objective, while other types of legislation might require a 
cogent demonstration of a demonstrable risk to an urgent state in-
terest. I£ I were in a position to judge, I would be inclined to give 
as much weight as Justice Douglas does255 to the interest of society 
in free expression; but I would permit restraints designed to protect 
rights of privacy, and I would accept regulation for the insulation of 
children from obscenity, although my test for accepting such regula-
tion would not be quite so lax as the minimum rationality test en-
dorsed in Ginsberg v. New York.256 Being a professor, and not a 
judge, however, I am content to suggest the factors to be weighed 
for decision, and to leave the judgment to those who have been as-
signed that task. 
The effect of employing the suggested framework for decision, 
therefore, would not be to dictate the end product of constitutional 
doctrine regarding state regulation of obscenity. But employing this 
structure of the relevant factors would help to eliminate the ad hoc 
and episodic, the knee-jerk and "gut reaction" elements of ob-
scenity law frequently decried under the regime of Roth. Moreover, 
since it provides for the treatment of obscenity as expression pro-
tected as much as, but no more than, any other class of speech, it 
would relieve the Supreme Court of the politically sensitive task of 
deciding case by case the obscenity vel non of all types of sordid 
publications. Thus, it would not preclude the development of uni-
form constitutional standards but would put the Court in its rightful 
position of formulating such general standards rather than passing on 
particular publications one by one. 
The controversy surrounding the Court today is furious enough 
without the public reaction to what laymen can understand only as 
the Justices' own moral evaluation of salacious publications. We 
should hope that public hostility will never deter the Justices of the 
Supreme Court from fulfilling their constitutional duty, as their 
oath and conscience demand. But the existence of public reaction 
to constitutional doctrine heightens the importance of developing 
constitutional law in such a way that, in appearance as well as in 
substance, the principles and rules of law developed are generally 
applicable and are, so far as possible, objective or neutral. 
255. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra. 
256. 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968). See text accompanying notes 65-77 supra. 
